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COERCING COLLABORATION: THE CHESAPEAKE
BAY EXPERIENCE
JAMISON E. COLBURN*
The Chesapeake Bay, America’s largest and once most productive
estuary has attracted the single most sustained, deeply financed, politi-
cally rooted ecosystem restoration partnership in American history.
Troubles for the Bay were first recognized in the 1930s and serious ef-
forts to restore it to its ecological baselines date to the 1970s. Its water
quality problems stem largely from nutrient and sediment runoff and the
overfeeding of its microorganisms, leading to hypertrophication and
consequent oxygen depletion throughout the Bay.1 With the average
hypoxic zone now around 40% of the Bay’s area during summers, this
system’s fate is being decided today.2
In 2009, the Obama Administration took unprecedented steps to
knit together the Clean Water Act’s traditional pollution control tools with
decades of “collaborative” efforts that had been fashioned in the Chesa-
peake. What emerged was a synthesis of modeled targets, obligations,
and steps to their fulfillment meant to bring most of the Bay’s segments
into water quality standard attainment by 2025.3 The questions surround-
ing the legality of this approach have been litigated and the courts’ answers
were a resounding endorsement.4 They are many of the same questions
now being asked about the Administration’s “Clean Power Plan.”5
This Article uses a detailed case study of the Chesapeake to de-
scribe an emergent model of intergovernmental administration tailored
to address our largest-scale environmental problems. The Obama EPA’s
* Joseph H. Goldstein Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Penn State University. I thank
EPA Region III Senior Attorney Chris Day, Rob Brooks, Bill Buzbee, Shana Campbell
Jones, and Rena Steinzor for helpful comments and conversations on past drafts.
1 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ES-1 (Dec. 29,
2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/chesapeake-bay-tmdl/chesapeake-bay-tmdl-docu
ment [https://perma.cc/E2NZ-MXSW].
2 Cheryl Lyn Dybas, Dead Zones Spreading in World Oceans, 7 BIOSCIENCE 552, 553 (2005).
3 CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at ES-3.
4 See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. E.P.A., 984 F. Supp. 2d 289 (M.D. Pa. 2013),
aff’d, 792 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2015).
5 See Steven Cohen, The Clean Power Plan Overcomes Another Attack, HUFFPOST GREEN
(Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-cohen/the-clean-power-plan-over
_b_9068144.html [https://perma.cc/S5SX-FVC8].
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“total maximum daily load” (“TMDL”) in the Chesapeake has yet to be
replicated. But it should be. The TMDL and its supporting norms were
unique as an operational plan, achieving a level of transparency, ac-
countability, means/ends rationality, and continuous improvement that
were unprecedented at its scale. And whether this model can be repli-
cated elsewhere turns out to be as much a question of law as of politics.
INTRODUCTION
The Chesapeake Bay experience has been unique but also, para-
doxically, especially instructive. Beneath current events lay decades of
“collaborative” effort, principally by the watershed states, to avert feder-
alization of a steadily expanding problem. The problem is nutrient pollu-
tion—the excessive discharge of vital nutrients which literally overfeed
microorganisms until they choke the rest of the system to death—specifi-
cally, its diffuse sources, uncertain fate and transport, and jurisdictional
dispersion.6 In 2009, the Obama Administration announced a targeted
focus on nutrients in the Chesapeake Bay and the problem will never
look the same,7 for this experiment has yielded insights and outcomes
worth wide consideration.
Generations ago uncertainty was a reason for inaction. Today, un-
certainty remains the chief obstacle in the rational targeting of threats and
risks worth regulating. Allocating its burdens, a task many wish to avoid,8
is a necessity. At our disposal today is a vast array of measures routinely
lumped into orthodox piles like “legislation,” “regulations,” “guidance,” and
other, supposedly sub-regulatory, measures.9 Another array, voluntary,
“collaborative” measures, has been applied longer in the Chesapeake than
any other ecosystem-wide restoration program in the world. The federal
cost-share dollars that have subsidized these measures throughout the
watershed, whether in the form of “best management practices” (“BMPs”),
land acquisition, or civil infrastructure, are staggering.10 Some argue
6 See CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 1, at ES-3.
7 Exec. Order 13508, Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration, 74 FR 23099 (May 12,
2009).
8 See, e.g., Naomi Oreskes, Science and Public Policy: What’s Proof Got to Do With It?, 7
ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 369 (2004) (arguing that science can never provide the amount of proof
demanded by skeptics of regulation because the stakes are rarely about the science itself).
9 See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Christopher Carrigan & Cary Coglianese, The Politics of
Regulation: From New Institutionalism to New Governance, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 107
(2011); Charles F. Sable & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53 (2011).
10 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ACHIEVING NUTRIENT AND SEDIMENT REDUCTION GOALS
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that they have failed.11 This Article argues that the differences between
“regulatory” and “voluntary” are quickly eroding in our governance
design practices. The tools of distributed governance, peer accountability,
and estimative analysis are rendering these differences increasingly
obsolete yet, paradoxically, they are a growing threat to clear thinking
about our choices.12
Every system’s approach sits in some tension with law and democ-
racy, because law (if not democracy) is essentially jurisdictional whereas
systems (especially natural systems) are continuous and interconnected.
Ecosystem approaches to pollution are doubly problematic given how
little is known about many pollutants’ fate and transport. Nutrient
pollution may be a singularly vicious problem in this light given its
complex generation of system effects, ubiquity in nature, ties to our
modern food systems and consequent profusion of sources.13
Fragmented jurisdictions and hypersensitivity to the supposed
tyranny their consolidation would bring have been the Clean Water Act’s
lived experience.14 The statute is structured around a division of “point”
IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY: AN EVALUATION OF PROGRAM STRATEGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION
(2011) [hereinafter NRC EVALUATION].
11 See, e.g., HOWARD R. ERNST, FIGHT FOR THE BAY: WHY A DARK GREEN AWAKENING IS
NEEDED TO SAVE THE CHESAPEAKE BAY XII (2010) [hereinafter ERNST, FIGHT FOR THE BAY].
12 For general accounts of this peer-to-peer accountability, see Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan
Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the
European Union, in EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS
A NEW ARCHITECTURE 1 (Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin eds., 2010); Joanne Scott
& Jane Holder, Law and New Environmental Governance in the European Union, in LAW
AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 211 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2006); Bradley C. Karkkainen et al., After Backyard Environmentalism: Toward A
Performance-Based Regime of Environmental Regulation, 44 AMER. BEHAV. SCI. 692, 693
(2000); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998).
13 See STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GROUP, AN URGENT CALL TO ACTION:
REPORT OF THE STATE-EPA NUTRIENT INNOVATIONS TASK GROUP (Aug. 2009) [hereinafter
URGENT CALL TO ACTION]. Dewey argued that true public problems tend generally to have
this structure. See JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS (1927).
14 The Supreme Court has been particularly—some would say compulsively—concerned
with the Act’s jurisdiction-defining terms. Jurisdictional “waters,” of course, were (not)
sorted out in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985), Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. V. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), and
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). But the list of other precedents construing
jusidical terms is long. See Los Angeles Cty. Floor Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 710 (2013) (“discharge”); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326
(2013) (“point source”); Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conserv. Council, 129 S. Ct. 2458
(2009) (“pollutant”) ; S.D. Warren v. Maine, 547 U.S. 370 (2006) (“discharge”); S. Fla.
Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) (“addition” of a pollutant); PUD
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(jurisdictional) from “nonpoint” (non-jurisdictional) pollutant sources, a
fiction animating the Act as a whole.15 Other major extra-jurisdictional
threats include air deposition, hydro-modifications and water withdraw-
als.16 Experiments in “cooperative federalism” have long been our norm,17
generating as much uncooperation as anything else.18 But some recent ac-
counts of accountability have cast many of these arrangements in a harsh
light, urging the courts to intervene.19 What can be called “dialogue”20 can
just as easily be regarded as liability-shifting, i.e., evading an electorate,21
leaving little coherent doctrine and even less sense of appropriate power
sharing.22 Statutes that apportion discretion to state or federal regulators
are alternatively interpreted to permit or to forbid one of them from im-
posing enforceable constraints on the regulated,23 and no general equilib-
rium around which planning can be done has arisen.24
No. 1 Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994) (“water quality standard”);
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (“applicable” water quality standard).
15 See American Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1197 (10th Cir. 2001) (ÒEPA
maintains that the Act does not grant it authority to regulate nonpoint sources of pol-
lution . . . .).
16 See NRC EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 42–45.
17 See, e.g., Symposium on Cooperative Federalism: Foreword, 23 IOWA L. REV. 455 (1938).
18 See Jessica Bullman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerkin, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256 (2009).
19 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997); Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011); see generally JOHN HART
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Larry Kramer,
Putting the Politics Back in the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
215 (2000). For a variety of reasons, what looks like accountability-forcing judicial review
can be to quite the opposite effect. See Jacob E. Gersen & Matthew C. Stephenson, Over-
Accountability, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 185 (2014).
20 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
21 See George A. Berman, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 413 (1994).
22 See Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994); Kramer,
supra note 19, at 288–89 (“The practical difficulties of working out the limits of Con-
gress’s power through litigation are depressingly familiar, having been reproduced each
time the Supreme Court has tried its hand at the problem.”).
23 Compare Nat’l Ass’n of Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 672–73
(2007) (holding that the Clean Water Act creates a nondiscretionary duty to delegate
program authority to state if listed statutory factors are fulfilled), with EPA v. EME
Homer City Gen., L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1601 (2014) (holding that EPA need not await a
state’s attempt to regulate before promulgating a federal plan). The core case has long
been where the state—not EPA—is to balance the costs and benefits of controlling the
sources of pollution. See, e.g., Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
24 Cf. Robert Ahdieh, The Visible Hand: Coordination Functions of the Regulatory States,
95 MINN. L. REV. 578, 618–48 (2010) (showing how coordinated behaviors can converge
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Most arguments about these forces eventually find Mancur Olson’s
“logic” of collective action and the thesis that smaller, concentrated groups
tend to outperform larger, more diffuse ones in our political system.25
Olson’s logic was developed to be scaled: he contrasted the immensely
successful, powerful Farm Bureau—with its federated structure—to the
Grange, which grew meteorically but quickly failed as a national power.26
Olson’s argument is that those who seek something from the political
system do best to align with stakeholders whose benefit/cost ratios on
outcomes and contribution lie ahead of their own.27 It gives little (if any)
force to the argument that the federal government is more (or less) likely
to enact public-regarding policies.28
Indeed, in a system that divides the jurisdiction to prescribe legal
rights and duties between two distinct sovereigns, the provision of public
on equilibriums of a regulator’s choosing even without a coercive command as long as the
right stabilities exist). Finally, once authority is left with states another struggle remains
between state and local prerogatives. With over 1,600 local governments and four major
metropolitan areas in the watershed, the state/local tensions have been just as defining
as the federal/state. See ERNST, FIGHT FOR THE BAY, supra note 11, at 39–40.
25 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 5–52 (1965).
26 Id. at 148–59. This essential point is often obscured in the vast literature on choosing
jurisdictions for public goods/problems. See, e.g., Daniel C. Etsy, Revitalizing Environmental
Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 587–97 (1998).
27 Olson’s work may belong to a larger tradition grounding self-governance’s limitations
in the participants’ self-interestedness. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMO-
CRATIC THEORY (1956); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957);
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 43–62 (2d ed. 1965).
28 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, A Positive Political Economic Theory of Environmental
Federalization, 64 CASE W. L. REV. 1549 (2014) (arguing that the U.S. Senate only permits
federalizing a policy where a majority of states will benefit); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND
POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013) (arguing that
voters’ “rational ignorance” is more likely in larger, aggregative jurisdictions than in
smaller ones); KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL
IN AMERICA (2006) (attributing the failure of gun control advocacy in the United States
to, among other factors, national organizations’ inability to agree on a unifying message,
the gun industry’s strength in Washington, and the failure to protect incremental gains at
the state and local level); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation:
A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabili-
tating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom” Rationale for Federal
Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); E. Donald Elliott et al., The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985) (observing that
many industrial sectors have pushed hard to federalize environmental law); Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (arguing that Delaware outcompeted other jurisdictions in
benefitting the shareholders of companies incorporated there).
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goods generally entails cooperation between the sovereigns—and their
stakeholders.29 Each sovereign is an internally plural agent;30 each is
subject to some form of electoral competition;31 and each is reciprocally
influenced by the others.32 With regard to common pool resources, per-
haps the best account of the basic predicament has been Derek Parfit’s
contributors’ dilemma. These are many-party dilemmas involving “out-
comes that benefit even those who do not help to produce them.”33 The
choice whether to contribute to the outcome, however, is unavoidably
embedded in a context of many others’ similarly structured choices.34
29 This can take the form of jurisdictional competition. See DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUC-
TURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 37–40 (2004). It can take the form of networked deliberation. See Jody Freeman,
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997). And it
can take the form of various hybrids of the two. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpre-
tation and Policy Engineering, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (2012).
30 The institutions featuring in the Chesapeake Bay experience have included the Presi-
dent and Congress, the federal courts, EPA, the Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) and
the U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”), the governors and legislatures of Maryland, Pennsyl-
vania, and Virginia and the several jurisdictional agencies thereof, the Chesapeake Bay
Commission (“CBC”), the Chesapeake Bay Program (“CBP”) and a “Principals’ Staff
Committee” thereof amalgamating state and EPA authorities. Of course, each of these
institutions can be broken down into their own internal pluralities. See Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Congressional Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992); Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Inter-
pretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005).
Nonetheless, each reaches its own conclusions and takes its own actions.
31 With plausible assumptions about principal/agent dynamics in the electoral contests at the
different levels, it can be shown that various agents will make rational choices that are not
in their principals’ true interests. See Gersen & Stephenson, supra note 19, at 189–209.
32 See Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV.
(2005); Barry G. Rabe, Power to the States: The Promise and Pitfalls of Decentralization,
in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S: REFORM OR REACTION 31 (Norman Vig &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. (1997). The threat of strategic action which renders col-
lective action incoherent has long informed the theory of good collective decision-making
procedures. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 27, at 23–30. But the threat’s potency
and exact scope have eluded rigorous quantification. See GERRY MACKIE, DEMOCRACY
DEFENDED (2003).
33 DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 61 (1984). Parfit continued: “It can be true of each
person that, if he helps, he will add to the sum of the benefits, or expected benefits. But only
a very small portion of the benefit he adds will come back to him. Since his share of what he
adds will be very small, it may not repay his contribution. It may thus be better for each if
he does not contribute. This can be so whatever others do. But it will be worse for each if
fewer others contribute. And if none contribute this will be worse for each than if all do.” Id.
34 The interaction of payoffs and contributions distinguishes Parfit’s dilemma from simple
prisoners’ dilemmas. Early analyses of that dilemma were careful to note the limits of its
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Moreover, the contribution is often self-restraint, as with the commuters
who go faster if they drive—unless they all drive in which case all would
go faster by taking buses.35 Collective contributory goods can thus elicit
behaviors very different from those elicited by simpler goods.36 Each
contribution can, but might not, motivate others’ contributions. And they
may or may not involve thresholds beyond which enough contributions
have been made to alter the significance of all contributions.37 Most
importantly, we have no reason to presume that individuals perform the
calculations needed to assess these choices accurately.38 Collective con-
tributory goods, thus, challenge the very ideal of collective rationality. It
is only in constructed environments with near-perfect information that
we can plausibly assume a lack of objections means that business-as-
usual is not costly or harmful to someone.39 Individual contributors might
even face a contributory burden which is smaller than the burden of
calculating their (actual) position(s). We might realistically presume,
thus, that the social dynamics here are simply too complex to map and
certainly that they are richer than a one-dimensional game where payoffs
and players remain predictable.40 Cooperation and conflict do not reduce to
any set of assumptions about people, selves, and others or their rational-
ity. Real contributory projects typically entail a continuing series of choices
between: (1) “defecting” and serving only oneself; (2) contributing irre-
spective of one’s own causal efficacy; (3) seeking some degree of coopera-
tion in one’s contribution with some (ostensibly) sufficient number of
others to achieve causal efficacy; and/or (4) learning how to measure the
utility in the real world. See, e.g., James Buchanan, Ethical Rules, Expected Values, and
Large Numbers, 76 ETHICS 8 (1965). Too much recent work does not.
35 See PARFIT, supra note 33, at 61.
36 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 25, at 57–58.
37 On the role of such thresholds and the ways they factor into individual choices, see
DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (1965).
38 See RICHARD TUCK, FREE-RIDING 30–62 (2008).
39 Compare PARFIT, supra note 33, at 85–86 (“In small communities, it is a plausible claim
that we cannot have harmed others if there is no one with an obvious complaint, or
ground for resenting what we have done.”), with OLSON, supra note 25, at 166 (“The
rational individual in the economic system does not curtail his spending to prevent
inflation . . . because he knows, first, that his own efforts would not have a noticeable
effect, and second, that he would get the benefits of any price stability that others
achieved in any case.”).
40 Thus, Parfit’s contributors remain in their dilemma despite being able to communicate—
something the classic prisoners’ dilemma rules out. TUCK, supra note 38, at 23–24. In
game theoretic terms, contributors will not know whether they are playing a “zero sum”
or “non-zero sum” game, nor will they know the values of the expected utilities/“payoffs.”
See MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION 38, 68–78 (1970).
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causal accumulation of contributions.41 Practical questions proliferate
about each of these possibilities.42
While environmental groups often get and take credit for having
spurred rational collective action,43 the truth is messier. What they can
most often take credit for is upsetting an entrenched, inactive elite—a
governance cartel—which refuses to confront its own failure.44 Court
orders, however, do little to create or sustain cooperation. Indeed, as risk
regulation’s struggle with uncertainty has given way to the era of compu-
tational modeling, the analytical methods themselves have had to shoul-
der that burden. Alternative tendencies to mistake models as “truth
machines”45 or to dismiss them as voodoo have long been at work in the
Chesapeake. One of the major innovations examined below has been the
rise of crowd-sourced models that improve continuously while still guiding
high-stakes choices. The broad communication of these methods falls into
a now familiar tug of war between experts, nonexperts and those who
would arbitrate their respective roles.46 And the Chesapeake may be
revealing new high ground in that broader war.47
This study proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the reality of stat-
utes like the CWA and administrative agencies like EPA as sources of
law today. Part II explains the rise of alternatives in the Chesapeake—the
Bay’s “collaborative” past. Part III examines the Obama Administration’s
41 Cf. LYONS, supra note 37, at 71–96 (exploring the rationality of individual action when
threshold effects are possible and noting that some actors are sometimes in position to
measure contributions). “ ‘Rationality’ is a normative concept and it is a contingent fact
that people are actually rational. Thus to deny that it is in the last analysis rational to
defect from a large-scale collaborative activity is not to deny that as a matter of fact
people may fairly consistently do so.” TUCK, supra note 38, at 112–13.
42 See LYONS, supra note 37, at 161–62.
43 See, e.g., JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THE RIVERKEEPERS (1997).
44 See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1056–62 (2004).
45 See Wendy Wagner et al., Misunderstanding Models in Environmental and Public
Health Regulation, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 293, 295 (2010); Elizabeth Fisher et al.,
Understanding Environmental Models in Their Legal and Regulatory Context, 22 J.
ENVTL. L. 251, 266 (2010).
46 See Dan Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk,
119 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2006). Kahan and colleagues argue, contrary to Sunstein and
others, that “[i]ndividuals adopt stances toward risk that express their commitment to
their particular ways of life. Their risk perceptions might or might not be accurate when
evaluated from an actuarial standpoint; policies based on them might or might not be in
the interest of society measured according to any welfarist metric,” but that this under-
mines neither their virtue nor validity. Id. at 1088.
47 See infra notes 163–80 and accompanying text.
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novel synthesis of these two, begun in 2009, while Part IV considers pos-
sibilities for the replication of this synthesis elsewhere.
I. STATUTORY INTRANSITIVITY: STATUTES AS GOALS
AND DELEGATIONS
Legislation today is overwhelmingly intransitive: it is a delegation
of authority that, in its ambiguity as to what rules ought to govern,
leaves the law’s content unspecified.48 Pollution control statutes like the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”) have been its apotheosis: they entrench
vaguely worded, programmatic goals, not firm rules of conduct, and
delegate to others the responsibility of achieving them.49 The statute is
no less a statute for it, but the legal and normative character of such a
collective act has slipped from its orthodox footings.50 As the Supreme
Court recognized long ago, if it is a subordinate source of some kind that
actually specifies the law’s meaning, neither is “complete without the
other, and only together do they have any force.”51 By these metrics,
though, many environmental regulations are increasingly intransitive
too, as section A explains about the CWA’s water quality standards.52
And if it is the manuals and memos, guidance, orders, circulars, bulle-
tins, and the like specifying actual legal purposes and determinate obli-
gations,53 the legal interpreter’s job shifts significantly.
48 See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 369, 380–85 (1989); EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS
AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 210–21 (2005) [hereinafter RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT].
Intransitive legislation, instead of setting the rights and duties of A and B, directs C to
specify their rights and duties, often on an evolving basis. Now an important caveat is
that some legislation still has “striking specificity” for the world’s A’s and B’s. Peter L.
Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 427, 434 (1989). These exceptions prove the rule which is, more than anything,
a consequence of scale. Cf. id. at 431 (“One of the differences between the Congress of the
transitive late-19th century and the Congress of the intransitive present is the simple
fact of size . . . . The change reflects a dramatic alteration in the nature and possibilities
of the legislative function.”).
49 See, e.g., Daniel Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Com-
pliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 298 (1999).
50 But cf. JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999) (arguing that legisla-
tion’s dignity has been diminished in the eyes of contemporary jurisprudential theory
without even a mention of its trend toward intransitivity).
51 United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431, 438 (1960). See generally Henry P. Monaghan,
Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
52 See infra notes 65–98 and accompanying text.
53 See Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative
Regulation, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 159 (2000); see also Sam Kalen, The Transformation of
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The question is how and, more particularly, how is it relevant to
public problem solving? The answer from legal philosophers has been:
not much. To read the bulk of their literature, the single most prominent,
institutionally entrenched trend of the last century—the growth of
intransitive legislation and the rise of its administration by scores of
regulatory agencies—is unimportant to law’s foundations.54 But in the
real world, administrative authority lies at the law’s core.55 Given how
that authority is split between, interspersed with, and checked by the
authority of our states, indeed, administrative authority in a “cooperative
federalist” model are, with little exaggeration, becoming everything.56
EPA’s “shared regulatory space” involves not only other parts of the ex-
ecutive establishment and the federal courts,57 but scores of state envi-
ronmental regulators as well.58 Restoring something like the Chesapeake
Bay means navigating highly elaborated institutional and jurisdictional
boundaries and relations,59 spread unevenly across a 64,000-square-mile
area spanning six states and the District of Columbia.60
A codicil—Congress’s occasional choice to legislate with extreme
specificity61—underscores the political context. A broadly delegative statute
Modern Administrative Law: Changing Administrations and Environmental Guidance
Documents, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 101 (2009).
54 Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875,
881 (2003) (arguing that “academic jurisprudence” and constitutional theory have kept
focused on “desiccated abstractions” relative to the real world of law and governance).
55 See RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT, supra note 48; Dorf, supra note 54, at 932 & n.216.
56 See Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism,
in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE
QUESTION 13 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). Indeed, if “[a]ccountability can be roughly
defined as the ability of one actor to demand an explanation or justification of another
actor for its actions and to reward or punish that second actor on the basis of its per-
formance or its explanation,” then intergovernmental “accountability” is as vital as is
electoral accountability to our system. Edward L. Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and
the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2098–2119 (2005) [hereinafter
Rubin, The Myth of Accountability].
57 See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012); see also William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Com-
mons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2003).
58 See J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES:
EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 39–48 (1998).
59 See HOWARD R. ERNST, CHESAPEAKE BAY BLUES: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE STRUGGLE
TO SAVE THE BAY (2003).
60 Id. at 10.
61 See Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A Po-
tential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175 (1992);
Craig N. Oren, Detail and Delegation: A Study in Statutory Specificity, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 143 (1990).
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directing an administrator to pursue broadly stated goals can be imple-
mented by an agency over extended intervals with only episodic, irregular
interventions by later congresses.62 Of this central model, the Clean
Water Act, particularly its operation in the Chesapeake, has been exem-
plary. As I argue below, iterated goal-setting and problem-solving are
revealing important insights for other, similarly scaled environmental
problems. Section A explains the CWA’s “water quality standards” as
law. Section B recounts an especially instructive attempt to make these
standards clearer and more prescriptive.
A. What Sort of Legal Norm Is a Water Quality Standard?
The CWA’s nebulous allocation of authority is nowhere more
prominent than in the statute’s water quality standards (“WQSs”) provi-
sion, Section 303. By Sections 303(a)–(c), states must have WQSs for all
surface waters—whether by state or EPA creation.63 They must be set
“taking into consideration [the waters’] use and value for public water
supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agri-
cultural, industrial, and other purposes,”64 and be reviewed regularly.65
A WQS consists of “designated uses”66 and the criteria meant to verify and
protect them.67 Importantly, EPA regulations provide that no discharge
permit may be issued if it will cause or contribute to the violation of a
62 The literature on Congress’s use of its tools is vast. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN &
WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 56–57 (1981) (noting that a massive increase
in congressional staff enable “strategically placed interest groups” to push parochial
initiatives into law and appropriations regardless of overall congressional support).
63 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)–(b) (2012). If EPA finds in its review that a state’s WQS is insuf-
ficient or inconsistent with the Act’s “requirements,” it may promulgate substitutes. Id.
§ 1313(c)(4).
64 Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A) (2012) (emphasis added).
65 Id. § 1313(c)(1) (requiring that WQSs be reviewed in a public hearing at least once
every three years).
66 A “designated use” will, ideally, draw the criteria needed to protect it. States are free
to adopt any “use classification system they see as appropriate, except that waste trans-
port and assimilation is not an acceptable use in any case.” U.S. EPA, WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS HANDBOOK 2-1 (2d ed. 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/sites/production
/files/2014-10/documents/handbook-chapter2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5HQ-A2EB]. But the
predominant themes that emerged from most states’ designated uses and use classifi-
cations has been imprecision and over-generality.
67 The 1972 Amendments provided for the continuance of existing WQSs, see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(a) (2012), but also suggested that their triennial review and updating was to
transition any extant standards into conformance with the new Section 303 approach. See
N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How the 1972
Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Reform, 4 GEO.
WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 80, 101–02 (2013).
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WQS.68 The WQS’s relative stringency is not directly decided by Section
303, though.69 EPA has long maintained a rebuttable presumption that the
uses named in § 101(a)(2) are attainable—that they must be designated
uses until proven otherwise70—and it has likewise maintained that “exist-
ing uses” be maintained until it is proven that they cannot be.71 This
“bounded discretion mandate”72 has long allocated the burdens of uncer-
tainty in a special way. Designated uses without criteria or protective rules
would make no practical difference.73 And as the science of measuring
water quality and its impacts on aquatic flora and fauna has improved,
metrics have evolved.74 But the “criteria” EPA sets informing WQS devel-
opers,75 like the “information” it is to publish for these same parties “on the
measurement and classification of water quality,”76 are not (with one ex-
ception) supposed to be binding.77 Unlike the criteria EPA must set before
68 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i) (2015).
69 Section 303(c)(2)(A), besides its long list of factors to balance, states that WQSs “shall
consist of the [waters’] designated uses” and the “water quality criteria for such waters
based upon such uses.” Id. § 1313(c)(2)(A). But it then dissembles in the following state-
ment about stringency: “[s]uch standards shall be such as to protect the public health or
welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter.” Id.
(emphasis added). The Act’s “purposes” from Section 101 include the restoration and
maintenance of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,”
id. § 1251(a), and that “wherever attainable,” water quality provide for the “protection
and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife” and “recreation in and on the water.” Id.
§ 1251(a)(2) (emphasis added). The conventional wisdom has long been that states enjoy
wide latitude to choose the levels of water quality for their surface waters. See, e.g.,
Mississippi Comm’n on Natural Res. v. Costle, 624 F.2d 1269, 1275 (5th Cir. 1980).
70 See Idaho Mining Ass’n, Inc. v. Browner, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1081–82, 1088–98 (D.
Idaho 2000).
71 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2015) (anti-degradation). This anti-degradation norm puts
added force behind any given “use” designation. See Jonathan A. Chilson, Note: Keeping
Clean Waters Clean: Making the Clean Water Act’s Anti-Degradation Policy Work, 32 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 545 (1999).
72 See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Comman-
deer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1011 (1995)
(“Bounded discretion mandates order state officials to reach a specified federal objective,
but afford these officials some degree of discretion in deciding how to do so.”).
73 Cf. James R. Karr & Daniel R. Dudley, Ecological Perspective on Water Quality Goals, 5
ENVTL. MGMT. 55 (1981) (arguing that the interim/provisional goals of “fishable” and “swim-
mable” are inadequately protective without specific measures like indices of biotic integrity).
74 See R.J. Davies-Colley & D.G. Smith, Turbidity, Suspended Sediment, and Water
Clarity: A Review, 37 J. AMER. WATER RES. ASS’N 1085 (2001) (reviewing literature and
experimentation that led to turbidity’s replacement as a criterion of water clarity).
75 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1) (2000).
76 Id. § 1314(a)(2)(C).
77 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395, 1398–99 (4th Cir. 1993). The
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fixing its own national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”) under the
Clean Air Act (“CAA”),78 EPA’s water quality criteria are only ever “recom-
mended,” no matter their precision, scientific grounds, or other merits.79
So what kind of norm is a WQS—what is its practical difference?
Section 302 vests EPA with authority to create water quality-derived
“effluent limitations” without even mentioning Section 303’s WQSs.80 Yet
Section 303 WQSs are now the CWA’s main drivers.81 First, the nature
of the WQS depends on its expression—the goal it entrenches. The more
geographically, biologically, or purposively specified, the more the WQS
as a goal makes a practical difference.82 Because EPA’s approval or sub-
stitution of any state WQS or its criteria is subject to arbitrariness re-
view—a pressure point many litigants know well—specific goals typically
become highly prescriptive.83 Section 303(d)(1) requires states to identify
waters where Subchapter III’s effluent limitations “are not stringent
exception is criteria for “pathogens and pathogen indicators for coastal recreation waters.”
33 U.S.C. § 1313(i)(2). Any criteria EPA adopts thereon must be adopted by states. Id.
78 See 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2) (1998).
79 Section 304 does not specify the legal effect of the criteria but EPA has long held that
they are “recommended.” See Natural Res. Def. Council, 16 F.3d at 1401–02. Still, in
reviewing WQSs, EPA requires states deviating from any EPA § 304(a) criteria to
demonstrate that their chosen criteria are at least as well grounded, scientifically. Cf. 40
C.F.R. §§ 131.11(a)(1), 131.11(b)(1) (“States must adopt those water quality criteria that
protect the designated use. Such criteria must be based on sound scientific rationale and
must contain sufficient parameters or constituents to protect the designated use.”);
Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air
Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 210 n.41 (1999) (“State adoption of criteria recommended
by EPA under section 304(a) is usually sufficient, but is not always necessary, to meet
the minimum requirements of the Act.”). EPA’s criteria must reflect “the latest scientific
knowledge,” 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(1), but compliance with this standard has never been re-
viewed in a reported opinion.
80 See 33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (2000). Effluent limitations are any and all controls levied upon
point sources. See id. § 1362(11).
81 As an amalgam of state and federal normative authority, the WQS is arguably a “poly-
phonic” norm. See Schapiro, supra note 32, at 285–300. Federalism as polyphony rejects
preemption and the “truly local” versus “truly national” distinction in favor of “plurality,
dialogue, and redundancy.” Id. at 285–88.
82 See Robert W. Adler, The Decline and (Possible) Renewal of Aspiration in the Clean
Water Act, 88 WASH. L. REV. 759, 803–06 (2013).
83 See, e.g., Florida Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1167–69 (N.D.
Fla. 2012) (reviewing and setting aside EPA’s substitute criteria for Florida’s streams);
Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. U.S. EPA, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1264–69 (D. Or. 2003)
(reviewing EPA failure to object to state’s WQS based on faulty criteria); American Canoe
Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908 (E.D. Va. 1998); Idaho Conserv. League v.
Browner, 968 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Wash. 1997); Idaho Conserv. League, Inc. v. Russell, 946
F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1991).
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enough” to attain any applicable WQS,84 to prioritize such waters into a
rank-ordering,85 and to establish the “total maximum daily load” (“TMDL”)
of pollutants “loaded” to listed waters.86 EPA is to review each of these
determinations, as well.87 So even if the state sets the TMDL, EPA must
approve it, subjecting itself to arbitrariness review in the event of a suit.88
And these acts of submission, review, and resubmission— euphemistically
referred to as a “partnership” by the Supreme Court89—have become a
growing source of litigation surrounding the CWA’s administration.90
And what of WQS attainment? For decades, citizen-plaintiffs seek-
ing real enforcement of WQS sued to force the creation of the auxiliary
norm: the TMDL.91 The CWA provides that for listed impaired waters, the
“load” of pollutants “[s]hall be established at a level necessary to imple-
ment the applicable [WQSs] with seasonal variations and a margin of
safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning the
relationship between effluent limitations and water quality.”92 Judicial
decrees that TMDLs be issued led to the program capacity to churn them
out.93 Courts were enlisted to ensure the TMDLs were “daily” on the belief
84 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (2000). Effluent limitations, at least by operation of the CWA,
only control pollution from “point sources.” The threats to water quality without a “point
source”—polluted runoff, principally—cannot have “effluent limitations” applied to them
within the Act’s meaning of the term. This has led at least one court to the dubious con-
clusion that “the CWA does not require state to take regulatory action to limit the amount
of non-point water pollution introduced into its waterways.” Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S.
EPA, 415 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005).
85 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (2000).
86 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(c) (2000).
87 Section 303(d)(2) requires states to submit their listed waters and TMDLs to EPA for
its approval/disapproval “not later than thirty days after the date of submission.” 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (2000). If it disapproves, EPA is to list the waters and set their TMDLs
as it “determines necessary to implement” the applicable WQSs. Id.
88 See, e.g., Annacostia Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Jackson, 798 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D.D.C. 2011);
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Amigos Bravos v. Green,
306 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.D.C. 2004); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d
91 (2d Cir. 2001).
89 See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101 (1992).
90 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 904 (11th Cir. 2007); Florida Pub. Interest
Res. Group v. U.S. EPA, 386 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2004); Missouri Soybean Ass’n v. U.S.
EPA, 289 F.3d 509 (8th Cir. 2002); Friends of the Wild San, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 130 F.
Supp. 2d 1184 (D. Mont. 1999).
91 See OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND
IMPLEMENTATION 51–74 (1999). “By January 1999, litigation had challenged compliance
in more than half the states . . . and yet more was brewing.” Id. at 76.
92 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2000).
93 See James Boyd, The New Face of the Clean Water Act: A Critical Review of the EPA’s
New TMDL Rules, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 47 (2000). Holdings in the Seventh
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that such parameterization was crucial.94 They were enlisted to enforce
EPA’s regulation requiring discharge permits be conformed to the “assump-
tions” and “requirements” (if any) of any applicable TMDL95 and its regu-
lation requiring TMDLs provide for attainment of all uses in a WQS.96 But
these same citizens eventually learned a hard truth: neither the statute nor
EPA’s regulations say how—or even that—a TMDL is to be implemented
beyond the point sources whose permits it intersects.97 Indeed, nothing in
EPA’s regulations implementing Section 303(d) ever suggest a TMDL’s
having legal force upon completion.98 By EPA’s regulations, a TMDL is
just an equation—until there are permitted discharges involved.99 The
and Ninth Circuits to the effect that prolonged inaction by states on waters listed as
impaired amounts to a “constructive submission” of a failed, i.e., to-be-disapproved
TMDL—left the task to EPA in many cases. See Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992
(7th Cir. 1984); Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994). By the
late 1990s, this meant EPA was generating scores of TMDLs itself. See HOUCK, supra
note 91, at 56–63. Such work-to-the-standard behavior is not an uncommon response to
court orders in public law litigation. See Sabel & Simon, supra note 44, at 1028. By the
end of 2013, with over 65,000 TMDLs in total having been prepared, EPA committed
itself—unprompted by court order—to “developing a metric to replace . . . the simple tally
of TMDLs completed. . . .” Nancy K. Stoner, Acting Assistant Adm’r, U.S. EPA,
Memorandum to Regional Adm’rs: A New Long-Term Vision for Assessment, Restoration,
and Protection under [CWA] Section 303(d) Program, Dec. 5, 2013, at 4.
94 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. EPA, 446 F.3d 140, 144–48 (D.C. Cir. 2006). One district
court clearly punted the claim that a loading calculated with an annualized model, which
plaintiffs argued could not account for “seasonal variations,” was inadequately protective. See
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Fox, 93 F. Supp. 2d 531, 556 & n.21 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
95 See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 147.
96 See Annacostia Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Jackson, 798 F. Supp. 2d 210 (D.D.C. 2011).
97 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1029–31 (11th Cir. 2002); Amigos Bravos
v. Green, 306 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2004).
98 Although minimum elements of WQSs were set in Part 131, see 40 C.F.R. § 131.6, no
such elements were created for TMDLs. Cf. 40 C.F.R. § 130.7(c) (assuming TMDL is a
calculated quantity and naming the values that must be included and substantiated
therein, without specifying the means for turning a TMDL into “individual water quality
based effluent limitations”—as the subsection is titled). EPA’s definition is instructive:
a TMDL is the sum of all allocations of the receiving water’s “loading capacity” as be-
tween point sources, nonpoint sources, and “natural background.” See 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.2(e),
(i). Because in its view a TMDL “can be expressed in terms of either mass per time, toxic-
ity, or other appropriate measure,” 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i), EPA originally took the position
that TMDLs need not necessarily even be calculated as a “daily” quantity. It lost that
argument in court. See Friends of the Earth, 446 F.3d at 144–46.
99 See 40 C.F.R. § 130.7 (a TMDL is the sum of load allocations, wasteload allocations, and
a margin of safety); but cf. id. § 122.44(d)(1)(vii)(B) (requiring any NPDES permit issued
be “consistent with the assumptions and requirements of any available wasteload
allocation for the discharge” in an applicable TMDL); § 122.4(i) (prohibiting the issuance
of new NPDES permits where discharge will be to an impaired water).
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irony with nutrient pollution and TMDLs, of course, is how often non-
point sources are the chief threat.
More or less continually since 1998, thus, EPA has been weighing
amending the balance of uniformity and flexibility for WQSs and TMDLs
in its regulations.100 EPA’s rulemaking to make TMDLs more uniform,
prescriptive and enforceable ended in a particularly instructive mess re-
counted in Section B. A 2013 Government Accountability Office report
found the lack of uniform, prescriptive standards in TMDLs remains a
major obstacle in WQSs attainment nationally.101 And EPA knows it. A
notice of proposed rulemaking in 2013, while noting states’ “broad discre-
tion to determine the appropriate level of specificity to use in identifying
and defining designated uses,” acknowledged the tendency among states to
adopt and maintain generic, unrefined use designations, which neither cap-
ture the state’s objective(s) for a water body nor aid in its protection.102
The practical differences between a designated use of “aquatic life”
and one specifying the water course, the different species, their abun-
dances, distributions, expected seasonal variations, etc., can be immense—
assuming mechanism(s) for their attainment exist.103 And assuming it
survives the inevitable legal challenge(s).104 That makes monitoring and
100 See U.S. EPA, Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Water Quality Standards
Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 36742, 36744 (1998); U.S. EPA, Stakeholder Input; Revisions
to Water Quality Standards Regulation, 75 Fed. Reg. 44930 (2010); U.S. EPA, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking: Water Quality Standards Regulatory Clarifications, 78 Fed. Reg.
54518, 54520 (2013).
101 See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CLEAN WATER ACT: CHANGES NEEDED IF
KEY EPA PROGRAM IS TO HELP FULFILL THE NATION’S WATER QUALITY GOALS (2013)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
102 Water Quality Standards Regulatory Clarifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 54523 (proposed
Sept. 4, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 131); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
ASSESSING THE TMDL APPROACH TO WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT 23–30 (2001).
103 Add in the tendency to adopt “narrative” instead of quantitative criteria, and the median
WQS becomes difficult—if not impossible—to enforce without a surrogate norm. See, e.g.,
Florida Wildlife Fed’n v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (N.D. Fla. 2012). For example,
Massachusetts’s criterion for nutrients is that surface waters be “free of nutrients in con-
centrations that would cause or contribute to impairment of existing or designated uses.”
See Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. U.S. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 15 (1st
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2382 (2013). EPA has long resisted setting numeric
criteria for nutrients, see Roberta Parry, Agricultural Phosphorus and Water Quality: A
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Perspective, 27 J. ENVTL. QUAL. 258, 259 (1998),
although it finally did so in Florida pursuant to its Section 303(c) authority. See Jackson,
853 F. Supp. 2d at 1142–44.
104 In an otherwise deferential review the Florida district court hearing challenges to EPA’s
§ 303(c)(4) criteria for Florida’s streams set aside as arbitrary the values EPA had set in its
nutrient criteria. EPA was either unwilling or unable to find specific harms associated
2016] COERCING COLLABORATION 693
other data vital,105 and it makes the steps connecting a TMDL to actual
sources of pollution vital.106 The 2000 TMDL rulemaking showed how
sophisticated and attuned to scuttling such mechanisms many parties—
both regulated and unregulated—have become. But what has emerged
in the Chesapeake since is evidence that their strategic behaviors can be
checked nevertheless.
B. The 2000 TMDL Rulemaking: Making TMDLs More than Math
and Science?
TMDLs, once thought to be purely “informational,”107 are becom-
ing something fascinatingly unique in U.S. environmental law. They are
some function of the applicable WQS, of course (although latent factual
uncertainties surrounding most pollutants and receiving waters obscure
that function).108 As Section A showed, uses and criteria have become
embroiled in a tug-of-war between information and norms, the expert
and inexpert. TMDLs have further entangled EPA’s and the states’ rela-
tive powers: with tens of thousands of waters at issue, they are locked into
a thick repeat-play relationship that is simultaneously cooperative and
competitive.109 It is in this light that EPA’s failed 2000 rulemaking aiming
to firm up TMDLs’ legal force remains so instructive.
with its chosen nutrient concentrations, likely as a reflection of the “reference” methods it
used in the rulemaking deriving the criteria from other, similar streams with less observable
impairment. See Florida Wildlife Fed’n v. Jackson, 853 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1167–69 (N.D.
Fla. 2012).
105 Even assuming a citizen plaintiff sues to enforce Section 303, courts have held they
lack power to force EPA or the states to perform water quality monitoring. See, e.g.,
Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v. Reilly, 796 F. Supp. 1374, 1380 (W.D. Wash. 1992). If the data
does not otherwise exist, it will not be forthcoming.
106 See infra notes 285–301 and accompanying text.
107 See, e.g., Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2002). It has always been
an odd argument that the TMDL of Sections 303(d)(1)–(d)(2) is a purely informational
tool when Section 303(d)(3) actually provides in terms for a purely informational, i.e.,
nonbinding, TMDL for waters not listed under 303(d)(1)(A) or (B) and not supporting “a
balanced indigenous population of fish, shellfish, and wildlife,” whatever the applicable
WQS requires. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(3) (“For the specific purpose of developing in-
formation . . . .”) (emphasis added).
108 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(3) (1972) (“For the specific purpose of developing information
. . . .”) (emphasis added).
109 Cf. Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1355 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (noting the
possibility that a state might “knuckle under” to EPA’s coercive conditioning of federal
grant money on its implementation of TMDLs).
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After a Federal Advisory Committee Act panel issued a laundry
list of recommendations in 1998,110 EPA decided that TMDLs, whatever
their faults or deficits, had to have at least a target water body, the
major component values broken out from the aggregate pollutant “load-
ing” being calculated, allocations to an inventory of actual sources of
pollutant allowances, and an implementation plan complete with time-
lines, milestones, necessary controls, and the available state and local
authorities to impose the controls.111 In short, it proposed to transform
TMDLs into practicable WQS-attainment plans.112 For the single largest
source of water quality impairments nationally—nutrients from polluted
storm water runoff—this signaled an abrupt end to the ambiguity and
anonymity theretofore providing legal refuge.113 Indeed, given the CWA’s
jurisdictional fragmentation—its relative exemption of “nonpoint sources,”
the significant atmospheric deposition of nitrogen, mercury, and some
other pollutants, and its division of authority between EPA and the states—
this move threatened a wholesale rejection of the status quo.114 No longer
would TMDLs for waters impaired by different kinds of sources end up
110 See THE NAT’L ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR ENVTL. POLICY & TECH., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD (TMDL) PROGRAM (July 1998),
available at nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=400001OD.TXT. One of the recommen-
dations was that every TMDL be accompanied by an implementation plan “specifying and
quantifying control actions and implementation tools, methods, and authorities that will
be used to achieve the allocations and eliminate the impairment, in addition to schedules
and milestones for implementing the called-for actions . . . .” Id. at 32.
111 See U.S. EPA, Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regu-
lation, 64 Fed. Reg. 46012, 46031–35 (1999), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1999-10
-01/pdf/99-25307.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZVZ4-LHJL] [hereinafter NPRM]; U.S. EPA, Revi-
sions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions to the
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions to the
Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43586, 43595–43638
(2000) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-07-13/pdf/00-17831.pdf [https://perma.cc
/W6T8-RGGC] [hereinafter Preamble].
112 Compare NPRM, 64 Fed. Reg. at 46013 (“Existing regulations define a TMDL as a
quantitative assessment of a water quality problem.”), with Preamble, 65 Fed. Reg. at
43588 (“The goal of establishing TMDLs is to assure that water quality standards are
attained and maintained.”); see GAO REPORT, supra note 101, at 16–17.
113 See Boyd, supra note 93, at 60–61.
114 Boyd, supra note 93, at 47 (“The need to meet in situ [WQSs] set[ ] up a state-by-state con-
frontation between well-organized industrial interests—which can claim to have already
paid their pollution control dues—and organized agricultural, silvicultural, and munici-
pal interests that resist “expansion” of CWA-driven requirements to their hard-to-solve
nonpoint problems.”).
2016] COERCING COLLABORATION 695
as mere paper.115 Now they would ratchet states into regulating any
source of degradation, whatever its origins, or face citizen suits or an EPA
takeover under Section 303(d).116 And that is when Congress acted swiftly
to scuttle the rule.117 After two appropriations riders barring its implemen-
tation, the Bush EPA quietly withdrew the rule in March 2003, leaving
the extant Section 303 regulations in place.118
The 2000 rulemaking had few strong supporters, making its politi-
cal undoing easier.119 Much of what the 2000 rulemaking aimed to require
had long been recommended in EPA guidance.120 For example, EPA had
stated in 1991 that “[i]n order to allocate loads among both nonpoint and
point sources, there must be reasonable assurances that nonpoint source re-
duction will in fact be achieved. Where there are not reasonable assurances,
under the CWA, the entire load reduction must be assigned to point
sources.”121 What EPA headquarters had not done is clarify to states,
stakeholders or its regions that EPA would disapprove any TMDL lacking
such elements as “reasonable assurances” or implementation plans.122 Con-
sequently, different regional offices across EPA’s field infrastructure had
fashioned different ways of assessing proposed TMDLs—different ways of
working with others.123
115 TMDLs making load allocations to nonpoint sources required “a demonstration that
[it] will be implemented through regulatory or voluntary actions” meeting a four part test
of specificity, reliability, practicability, and demonstrated program capacity. See Pre-
amble, 65 Fed. Reg. at 43663. The unmistakable implication was that nonpoint sources
were no longer going to be hidden within the gaps and ambiguities of paper TMDLs or
generic WQS or criteria.
116 Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation and Revisions
to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program in Support of Revisions
to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 65 Fed. Reg. 43586, 43598
(2000), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-07-13/pdf/00-17831.pdf [https://perma.cc
/B86H-HQ4X].
117 See GAO REPORT, supra note 101, at 16–17.
118 The EPA announcement withdrawing the rule said that it was to consider alternatives
to improve it. See U.S. EPA, Final Rule: Withdrawal of Revisions to the Water Quality
Planning and Management Regulation, 68 Fed. Reg. 13608, 13609 (2003).
119 See GAO REPORT, supra note 101, at 17 & n.27; cf. OLSON, supra note 25, at 165 (“The
remaining type of group is the unorganized group—the group that has no lobby and takes
no action. Groups of this kind fit the main argument of this book best of all.”).
120 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY-BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL
PROCESS EPA PROCESS OF WATER (1991) [hereinafter TMDL GUIDANCE].
121 Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
122 GAO REPORT, supra note 101, at 16.
123 Cf. id. at 47–69 (finding extreme variability among states and EPA regions in how
they prepare, utilize, update, and enforce TMDLs).
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This diversity continued developing after 2000.124 Some regional
officials demand virtually everything that the 2000 rulemaking required.125
Some are much less exacting.126 EPA regional leadership in some places
prompted states to put minimum TMDL requirements into state law and
policy.127 But all regional officials report that they need state partners’
cooperation and that if a monitoring or implementation plan is beyond
a state’s willing contribution, they hit an impasse.128 The many variables
at work in these relationships are hard and soft, technical and political
all at once. The outcomes are high stakes, though, which is why the Con-
gressional Research Service still updates a report originally done analyzing
the 2000 rulemaking.129
For example, Vermont’s original TMDL for phosphorous in Lake
Champlain, approved by EPA in 2002, was later disapproved after a citi-
zens’ suit challenged EPA’s approval as arbitrary and capricious.130 In its
disapproval, citing among other things the stringency and accuracy of the
load allocations to nonpoint sources,131 EPA promised to provide contrac-
tor support to Vermont’s Department of Environmental Conservation’s
development of its model while at the same time praising that agency’s
“knowledge and capabilities.”132 The Vermont Governor’s letter submit-
ting the TMDL implementation plan EPA had demanded pled with EPA
124 See id. at 18–65. Of the more than 50,000 TMDLs EPA has approved since 1996, GAO
found that EPA lacked basic information about their implementation, that many long-
established TMDLs had not been implemented, and that an alarmingly high share of the
TMDLs reviewed by GAO’s experts lacked key elements like an implementation or
monitoring plan, reasonable assurances of nonpoint source controls, or identification of
all likely stressors to water quality. Id.
125 Id. at 48–49.
126 Id. at 49 (Region 6 reports that monitoring plans appear in about 1% of all their
approved TMDLs).
127 GAO REPORT, supra note 101, at 26.
128 Id. at 18–65.
129 See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CLEAN WATER ACT AND POLLUTANT TOTAL
MAXIMUM DAILY LOADS (2012), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42752.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NZ4Z-YGMH].
130 See U.S. EPA, Reconsideration of EPA’s Approval of Vermont’ 2002 Lake Champlain Phos-
phorous Total Maximum Daily Load (“TMDL”) and Determination to Disapprove the TMDL
at 2 (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/2002
-lake-champlain-tmdl-disapproval-decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5LP-CE4S] [hereinafter
Champlain Reconsideration]. EPA’s takeover of TMDLs in the Chesapeake arguably origi-
nated in a similar citizen suit. See Amer. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 30 F. Supp. 2d
908 (E.D. Va. 1998); Amer. Canoe Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 54 F. Supp. 2d 621 (E.D. Va. 1999).
131 See Champlain Reconsideration, supra note 130, at 3.
132 See id. at 1.
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to remember that “Vermont has a small, rural population” that had been
“working hard for the past forty years” to reduce phosphorous discharges
to the lake.133
In giving specific reasons for the disapproval, EPA relied both on
its regulations134 and its 1991 guidance135 to argue that the region had to
be sure (1) that nonpoint source control actions will occur, and (2) that
these actions will achieve enough phosphorous reduction to meet the
applicable water quality criteria.136 Given how Vermont proposed to find
its reductions, the region had no such assurances.
[T]he plan includes many recommendations for local gov-
ernment entities, and funding recommendations . . . . The
strength of this plan is that it provides a detailed discus-
sion of a wide range of actions needed to help implement
the TMDL. Its weakness . . . is that nearly all of the rec-
ommendations are just that—recommendations.137
As the Vermont example shows, the demand for “reasonable assur-
ances” that point and nonpoint source reductions are stringent enough
and will be implemented went below the waterline following the demise
of the 2000 rulemaking. The fight over the detail and specificity of a
TMDL’s implementation takes place in inter-agency dialogue, negotia-
tion and bargaining where agency guidance is made to serve law-like
functions without ever being standardized, codified, transparent in force
or effect, and without being recognizable to a court as “the law.” Given
Section 303’s history of combining normative intransitivity, state and
federal powers, contemporary administrative law’s core doctrines and
citizen suit litigation, this equilibration is perhaps not surprising. But its
133 Office of the Governor, Letter to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, U.S. EPA et al., May 29, 2014,
at 1–2, available at http://www.watershedmanagement.vt.gov/erp/champlain/docs/SGOV
-Copier14052911440.pdf#zoom=100 [https://perma.cc/X4W2-46EV].
134 See Champlain Reconsideration, supra note 130, at 8 (stating that TMDLs with load
allocations to nonpoint sources where best management practices or other controls are
“practicable” can include correspondingly less stringent allocations to point sources)
(citing 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i) (2011)).
135 See Champlain Reconsideration, supra note 130, at 8 (stating that a TMDL must provide
reasonable assurances that nonpoint sources control measures will achieve expected load re-
ductions in order for the TMDL to be “approvable”) (citing TMDL GUIDANCE, supra note 120).
136 See Champlain Reconsideration, supra note 130, at 9–10 (observing that Vermont had
premised its promised reductions on unverified estimates of averted phosphorous discharges
and that this kind of estimative practice did not provide reasonable assurances).
137 See id. at 11.
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dynamics are quickly overtaking the law of water quality protection and
restoration. The Chesapeake Bay TMDL has exemplified that evolution
and what resulted from the 2000 rulemaking’s implosion. Part II exam-
ines the TMDL’s findings, legal basis and its implementation in the CWA
context from which it grows.
II. PROBLEM-SOLVING IN THE CHESAPEAKE: FINDING A
WATERSHED’S GOALS
Attenuated relationships may be nature’s norm, but they create
havoc in our jurisdictionally minded legal world. Latent factual uncer-
tainty about these connections can sow even more of it. It took EPA
decades to connect tributaries and wetlands to water quality tightly
enough to sweep them within the CWA’s jurisdiction.138 These two facts
of life have framed our definition and pursuit of goals in environmental
regulation to a still underappreciated degree. Without measured pur-
poses environmental regulation is rudderless, but refining purposes has
inevitably devolved into a search for consensus that does not exist and
rarely materializes.
Water quality criteria and WQSs in the Chesapeake have taken
an irregular, but in a sense prototypical path from inchoate, estimative
expressions of pollution tolerances to statistically derived planning pa-
rameters, including the Bay’s distinct habitats and their variance, aimed
at restoring an entire ecosystem starting with its principal species.139
Section A reviews the Bay jurisdictions’ “collaborative” record while Sec-
tion B diagrams an innovative use of enforcement discretion to leverage
local, state and federal power to a sum greater than its parts.
A. The Bay Commission, Agreements and Program:
Collaboration, Entrenched
The principal watershed states—Virginia, Maryland and Pennsyl-
vania—have entrenched an institutionally fungible, overtly experimental
138 Juliet Eilperin & Darryl Fears, EPA Proposes Greater Protections for Streams, Wet-
lands Under Clean Water Act, WASH. POST (Mar 25, 2014), available at https://www
.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/epa-proposes-greater-protections-for
-streams-wetlands-under-clean-water-act/2014/03/25/4811cd36-b42c-11e3-b899-20667
de76985_story.html [https://perma.cc/759E-NJNK].
139 CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE BAY 2007 HEALTH AND RESTORATION AS-
SESSMENT (2007), available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/documents/cbp_26038.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E9GP-833J].
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effort across the watershed. Beginning in 1980,140 their Bay “commission”
comprised of state legislators connected the states’ political leaders and
eventually EPA’s Chesapeake Bay Program (“CBP”), in an unprecedented
institutional form.141 The governors of those states, EPA, the mayor of
D.C. and the chair of the commission signed a compact in 1983 promising
to “implement coordinated plans to improve and protect water quality and
living resources of the Chesapeake Bay estuarine systems.”142 That skeletal,
three paragraph pact was replaced four years later by an agreement an-
nouncing thirty-one separate goals.143 Chief among them was the reduc-
tion of nitrogen and phosphorous “entering the main stem” of the Bay by
40% in ten years.144 That target’s origin is uncertain, but it had nothing to
do with expertly calculated or exhaustively investigated knowledge of
cause-to-effect in the Bay.145 Like Section 303(d), though, it was a goal ex-
pressed as a pollutant “load”—a goal of unknown environmental value.146
140 See ERNST, supra note 59, at 13–14. In 1980, Virginia and Maryland formed the
Chesapeake Bay Commission which Pennsylvania joined in 1985. Id.
141 The Commission’s composition from state legislators is unique. Its role has evolved
and, although it has never been the one setting the goals, its capacity to deliver needed
fiscal and other supports within the member states has been a key building block of
program capacity. See ERNST, supra note 59, at 14–15, 133–34. Its major shortcoming,
in the eyes of many, has been its refusal to build bridges in Washington and to Congress
particularly. Id.
142 See CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, 1983 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, available at
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/content/publications/cbp_12512.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZS6S
-9N95] [hereinafter 1983 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT].
143 See 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, available at http://www.chesapeakebay
.net/content/publications/cbp_12510.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLU9-G8RA]; see also ERNST,
supra note 59, at 15.
144 See 1987 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 143. The stated goal—“reduce and
control point and non-point sources of pollution to attain the water quality condition
necessary to support the living resources of the Bay”—indirectly linked the 40% targets
to the group’s desired water quality outcomes. Id.
145 It was common knowledge that hypertrophication—the overfeeding of the system with
nutrients—was causing low dissolved oxygen levels in Bay waters by the time of the
original Bay agreement. See Ben A. Franklin, Chesapeake Bay Study Citing Pollution
Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1983, at A10. Data collected from 1950 forward “easily
resolve[d] the major spatial patterns in [dissolved oxygen] along the main axis of the Bay”
by 1984. James D. Hagy et al., Hypoxia in Chesapeake Bay, 1950–2001: Long-Term Change
in Relation to Nutrient Loading and River Flow, 27 ESTUARIES 634, 648 (2004). What was
missing was any knowledge quantifying an acceptable level of eutrophication. Cf. id. at
636 (“One may suspect that N loading from the Susquehanna River may have increased
2- to 3-fold since 1950.”).
146 This was (and is) true of many TMDLs, however, to whatever extent the pollutant con-
centrations yielding the “load” calculation(s) are not derived directly from the receiving
water and with high confidence. Cf. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Fox, 93 F. Supp. 2d 531
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The Chesapeake Bay Commission (“CBC”), EPA and the gover-
nors’ 1987 agreement cemented that commitment and began supplying
the science that promised to sort cause from effect.147 That was followed
up by Congress’s addition of Section 117 to the CWA, funding and direct-
ing EPA’s CBP to “coordinate state and federal efforts to improve Bay
water quality.”148 Program capacity soon followed, expanding to become
an exemplar of “collaborative management for large multijurisdictional
watersheds and for ecosystem management more generally.”149
Whatever the progress in intergovernmental relations, though,
water quality in the Bay kept declining, forcing amendments to the agree-
ment in 1992.150 The partners expanded their focus to major tributaries,
enhanced monitoring and the addition of submerged aquatic vegetation
(“SAV”) as an environmental quality metric.151 By 1998, the information
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (upholding use of phosphorus concentrations created for “aesthetic” pur-
poses as “guidance value” in TMDL for “water supply” designated use because no other
values were available).
147 See U.S. EPA REGION III ET AL., CHESAPEAKE BAY TOTAL MAXIMUM DAILY LOAD FOR NI-
TROGEN, PHOSPHORUS AND SEDIMENT at 1–4 (Dec. 29, 2010) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE
TMDL].
148 See Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 103, 101 Stat. 10 (1987), (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1267). Section
117 was overhauled in 2000 giving it its present form as a mandate/authorization to EPA
to “ensure that management plans are developed and implementation is begun by
signatories to the [2000] Chesapeake Bay Agreement to achieve and maintain . . . [among
other things] the nutrient goals of [any Bay Agreement] for the quantity of nitrogen and
phosphorus entering the Chesapeake Bay and its watershed.” Id. § 1267(g) (added by
Pub. L. No. 106-457, § 203, 114 Stat. 1967 (2000)).
149 Jonathan Cannon, Checking in on the Chesapeake: Some Questions of Design, 40 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1131, 1131 (2006). Others have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Bradley
C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism,
21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 191 (2002); Andrea K. Gerlak & Tanya Heikkila, Comparing Collab-
orative Mechanisms in Large-Scale Ecosystem Governance, 46 NAT RES. J. 657, 673–75
(2006); Annecoos Wiersema, A Train without Tracks: Rethinking the Place of Law and
Goals in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, 38 ENVTL. L. 1239, 1272–75 (2008).
Some are more critical of the “collaboration” that has predominated. See, e.g., Oliver A.
Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLs and the Chesapeake Bay, 41
ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10208 (2011); Shana Campbell Jones, Making Regional and Local TMDLs
Work: The Chesapeake Bay TMDL and Lessons from the Lynnhaven River, 38 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 277, 280–89 (2014); Rena Steinzor & Shana Campbell Jones,
Collaborating to Nowhere: The Imperative of Government Accountability for Restoring the
Chesapeake Bay, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 51 (2013).
150 CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 1.2.1.
151 See id. With SAV’s addition to the water quality concerns, visibility and clarity became
as prominent in the watershed’s goals as hypertrophication had been from the outset. See
William C. Dennison et al., Assessing Water Quality with Submersed Aquatic Vegetation, 43
BIOSCIENCE 86 (1993). The “tributary strategies” aimed at the largest of the Bay’s 100,000
tributaries were the first effort of the sort to comprehensively map, inventory, calibrate,
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the program and partners had gathered forced virtually all of the tidal
Bay segments onto the states’ Section 303(d) lists of impaired waters.152
Yet another agreement was crafted in 2000 in the shadow of what seemed
increasingly likely: a Bay-wide TMDL.153 Two categories of targets now
loomed largest: animal agriculture and municipal sewerage.154 Each was
a growing contributor of nitrogen, phosphorus, or sediment;155 each had
many subtypes spread unevenly throughout the watershed;156 each
involved stakeholders both familiar and vital to the watershed’s political
leaders.157 The information gathered and organized by the CBP, CBC and
states’ enhanced program capacities—unmatched in depth and reach—
proved the cause-and-effect relationships with increasing rigor.158 Still,
and model accurately each major sub-basin of an aggregate watershed for its contributions
of pollutants and the fate thereof in the larger system. See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra
note 147, at § 1.2.2.
152 CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 1.2.2.
153 See Cannon, supra note 149, at 1144–45.
154 Water clarity improved for a time and a resurgence in SAV was tracked beginning in
1983—likely as a result of improved sewage treatment and unusual weather conditions.
See Dennison et al., supra note 151, at 89. The “habitat requirements approach” began
with SAV as data were collected mapping its extent, variance over time, and experi-
mental survival rates. Id. at 90–91. This coincided with a growing focus on animal agri-
culture and unregulated sewerage discharges as decadal-scale increases in summer
hypoxic volume were found. See Hagy et al., supra note 145, at 648–54; see also Rebecca
Murphy et al., Long-Term Trends in Chesapeake Bay Seasonal Hypoxia, Stratification,
and Nutrient Loading, 34 ESTUARIES & COASTS 1293 (2011).
155 Municipal storm sewers, like industrial-scale animal agriculture, have both point-and
nonpoint-characteristics as pollution sources. While each can be fairly characterized by
the land use practices within any given parcel/jurisdiction, the fate and transport of their
pollution can be by conveyance and hydraulic flow at the same time. Growth in storm
sewers and industrial-scale animal agriculture was consistent throughout the watershed
from 1983 to 2003. See NRC EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 22–41.
156 For some, this juncture was where to declare victory in an ideological battle over the
relative efficacy of collaboration versus regulation. See Houck, supra note 149, at 10215
(deriding a “cherished political theory dismissive of regulation and wedded to the notion
that stakeholders would and could band together to solve common problems”); Steinzor
& Jones, supra note 149, at 53–55 (arguing that the Bay’s collaborative approaches were
doomed because of free-rider and right-of-exit problems faced by the watershed states in
how they govern agriculture and urban development, especially given Pennsylvania’s
relatively small stake in restoration).
157 See ERNST, FIGHT FOR THE BAY, supra note 11, at 1–23 (arguing that Olson’s logic of
small groups with concentrated interests versus larger groups with diffuse interests will
explain the Bay’s continuing decline until the collective stakes in the Bay’s restoration
outweigh agriculture and urbanization politically and economically).
158 See generally U.S. EPA REGION III, AMBIENT WATER QUALITY CRITERIA FOR DISSOLVED
OXYGEN, WATER CLARITY AND CHLOROPHYLL A FOR THE CHESAPEAKE BAY AND ITS TIDAL
TRIBUTARIES (April 2003) (EPA 903-R-03-002) [hereinafter 2003 WQC Guidance].
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the focus on pollutant “loading” necessitated an equally unprecedented
reliance on computational models of the systems’ workings.159 By April
2003, EPA could publish a massive guidance setting forth recommended
numeric criteria in a “habitat requirements approach,”160 secure in the
knowledge that it was backed by unprecedentedly deep data sets and
modeling.161 EPA had delivered its end of the bargain: the benchmarks
describing the dissolved oxygen, clarity and other conditions necessary
to protect the Bay’s “recreationally, commercially, and ecologically im-
portant species and biological communities.”162
With lawsuits forcing its hand, though, EPA began work on a
Bay-wide TMDL for nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment.163 The largest,
most spatially explicit TMDL ever developed resulted,164 as did persistent
questions about the TMDL’s basis in fact versus mathematical fabrica-
tion.165 Comprised of ninety-two distinct sub-basin TMDLs and grounded
in EPA’s 2003 criteria,166 the TMDL is predicated upon a “community”
model167 resolving the watershed into 309 separate land segments and
159 See id. at 194–97; Peter J. Tango & Richard A. Batiuk, Deriving Chesapeake Bay Water
Quality Standards, 49 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 1007, 1015–16 (2013).
160 See 2003 WQC Guidance, supra note 158, at 82; Tango & Batiuk, supra note 159, at
1010–11.
161 See Richard Batiuk et al., Derivation of Habitat-Specific Dissolved Oxygen Criteria for
Chesapeake Bay and Its Tidal Tributaries, 381 J. EXP. MAR. BIO. & ECOL. S204, S213
(2009). The 2003 criteria divide the Bay into five habitat types (or “designated uses”) and
then establish recommended values for dissolved oxygen (“D.O.”) by sensitive species in
each habitat, water clarity by salinity regions (in Secchi depth readings and light pene-
tration depths), and chlorophyll a in various concentrations and locations. See 2003 WQC
Guidance, supra note 158, at x–xvii. See Tango & Batiuk, supra note 159; Robert M. Hirsch
et al., Weighted Regressions on Time Discharge, and Season (WRTDS), with an Application
to the Chesapeake Bay River Inputs, 46 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N. 857, 858 (2010). Unfor-
tunately, even painstaking work to set criteria for one tributary or Bay segment does not
easily translate elsewhere in the Bay given the number of variables at work, making even
the massive 2003 document incomplete. See Tango & Batiuk, supra note 159, at 1022.
162 Batiuk et al., supra note 161, at S206. Each of the Bay tidal jurisdictions thereafter
adopted the criteria into their WQS. Id. at S205.
163 See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 1.4.2.
164 See Lewis C. Linker et al., Development of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Total Maxi-
mum Daily Load Allocation, 49 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 986 (2013).
165 See Michael Paolisso et al., Environmental Models and Public Stakeholders in the
Chesapeake Bay Watershed, 38 ESTUARIES & COASTS S97 (2013). Even the 2003 criteria
were heavily dependent on computational modeling of the different species’ responses to
stressors, reproductive resilience, etc. See Batiuk et al., supra note 161, at S205–07.
166 See Tango & Batiuk, supra note 159, at 1008; Linker et al., supra note 164, at 992.
167 See Gary W. Shenk & Lewis C. Linker, Development and Application of 2010 Chesa-
peake Bay Watershed Total Maximum Daily Load Model, 49 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N
1042 (2013). A “community” model is, in effect, crowd-sourced and continuously improving.
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1,063 separate river segments.168 By 2009, Bay scientists were able to
rough out the relative effectiveness of controlling pollutants from the
nineteen major tributaries.169 The results were troubling: some tributar-
ies were much bigger problems, pound for pound, than others.170 The
allocations had to reflect that knowledge, as problematic as it could be
politically.171 And with an online decision-support tool known as Scenario
Builder, state and local officials could translate land use and other
choices into changes in nitrogen, phosphorus and sediment loads and
compare them to the TMDL’s load and wasteload allocations (“LA/WLAs”)
for their segment(s).172
Id. at 1044. As a “mechanistic” model, however, the Chesapeake’s Hydrologic Simulation
Program—Fortran (“HSPF”), Phase 5.3, from which the load—and wasteload allocations
were derived, introduces a layer of discretionary choice—or knowledge-based ordering—
for every physical process/mechanism it incorporates. Cf. Wagner et al., supra note 45,
at 306–07 (comparing mechanistic to statistical models and observing that mechanistic
models are supposedly based on known constants). By contrast, statistical/phenomenological
models tend to offer more specific predictions of end-state conditions without differenti-
ating between mechanisms. Finally, HSPF is a “lumped parameter” model which means
that it cannot represent spatial locations of specific land use categories in the many sub-
watersheds within the overall basin and neither will it time lag responses to change.
NRC EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 18–19.
168 Shenk & Linker, supra note 167, at 1046. Of the 1,063 river segments, 287 had available
and representative streamflow observations for use in calibrating Phase 5.3—which was an
order of magnitude greater than the 20 used to calibrate Phase 4.3. Id. Still, with only 27%
of river segments having streamflow data available, and the fact that the Bay’s circulation
naturally renders northern and eastern-shore tributaries more influential within the
Bay, Linker et al., supra note 164, at 997, there is reason to doubt the model’s predictive
accuracy in its resolution of LA/WLA as between different regions of the watershed. Id.
169 See Ping Wang et al., Monitored and Modeled Correlations of Sediment and Nutrients
with Chesapeake Bay Water Clarity, 49 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 1103 (2013). Establishing
correlations between pollutant loadings and Bay water quality has always been compli-
cated by the long lag times of responses to inputs. Id. at 1104. The HSPF is linked to a
“three dimensional curvilinear hydrodynamic model (CH3D) [and] an eutrophication
model (CE-QUAL-ICM)” to compute the “concentrations of nutrients and suspended sedi-
ments that result from the [HSPF’s] inputs, the quantity of phytoplankton that grow and
decay, and the resulting water clarity and dissolved oxygen (DO) concentrations.” NRC
EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 18.
170 See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 6.3.1; Linker et al., supra note 164, at 993.
171 See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 6.3.1; cf. Linker et al., supra note 164,
at 992 (“A key objective of the nitrogen and phosphorus allocation methodology was to
first find a process, based on an equitable distribution of loads for which the basinwide
load for nitrogen and phosphorus could be distributed among the basin jurisdictions while
achieving the deep-water and deep-channel [dissolved oxygen WQSs] and then to achieve
the more locally influenced [WQSs] of chorophyll a and SAV-clarity.”).
172 Shenk & Linker, supra note 167, at 1046. “Scenario Builder converts the numerous
BMPs, which have various pollution reduction efficiencies depending on type and location
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Shortly after its rollout the TMDL was challenged by the Farm
Bureau and others. It was upheld in all respects in American Farm Bureau
Fed’n v. EPA.173 Plaintiffs argued that EPA had taken over the states’ pre-
rogatives, coercing them into using their authority over nonpoint sources
to pursue federal ends.174 They argued that the TMDL’s specificity as to
LAs and WLAs was contrary to the “cooperative” spirit of § 303—which
is, of course, highly ambiguous about who is to do what in the event EPA,
not the state, sets a TMDL.175 As Part III explains, though, the Chesa-
peake TMDL not only allocated LAs and WLAs to nonpoint and point
sources, respectively; it required and then incorporated implementation
plans from each jurisdiction which also had to demonstrate “reasonable
assurances” that they would meet their stated goals.176 More compelling,
thus, was the Farm Bureau’s claim that EPA’s demand of “reasonable
assurances” from the Bay jurisdictions that they would achieve the TMDL’s
goals was illegal.177 The court’s answer—that neither the allocations nor
the plans were “binding”178—rang hollow, though. For the Chesapeake
TMDL is more than just an “informational” tool.179 It is an operational
plan to attain the applicable WQS180—grounded as those standards are
in EPA’s water quality criteria and promises of real consequences for the
states if they fail. Section B maps this intersection in the Chesapeake.
in the watershed, to a common currency of nitrogen and phosphorus load that will be
generated by a given land use and estimates the area of soil available to be eroded.” NRC
EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 19.
173 Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 984 F. Supp. 2d 289 (M.D. Pa. 2013). An appeal
to the Third Circuit was rejected unanimously. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA,
792 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2015).
174 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 313–15. No watershed state joined the
plaintiffs in the suit, although twenty-one other states joined the Farm’s Bureau’s Third
Circuit appeal as amici. See Brief of the States of Kansas, Indiana et al., Am. Farm Bureau
Fed’n v. EPA, In the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit No. 13-4079
(Feb. 3, 2014) [hereinafter States’ Amicus Brief].
175 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 315–25.
176 See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 7.
177 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 325 (“Plaintiffs contend that this
requirement lacks any basis in the CWA and is therefore ultra vires. In support, Plain-
tiffs note that Congress blocked EPA’s previous attempt to implement revised TMDL
regulations that incorporate a ‘reasonable assurance’ requirement.”).
178 See id. at 327–29.
179 See id. at 327.
180 Cf. CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 1.4.2 (citing CWA § 117(g)(1) and stating
that “[b]ecause it establishes the Bay and tidal tributaries’ nutrient and sediment loading
and allocation targets, the Chesapeake Bay TMDL is itself such a ‘management plan’).
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B. Executive Order 13508: Guiding Enforcement Discretion By
Public Directive
The Act’s Sections 117 and 303 present a dilemma: Section 117(g)
arguably overrides 303(d) with Chesapeake-specific law.181 But it does so
in particularly opaque terms grounded in the Bay’s unique past.182 The
district court finessed the overlapping mandates,183 perhaps recognizing
the sort of problem EPA was attempting to solve.184 Without credible
commitments from each of its peers that strict limits on agriculture and
municipalities would finally be imposed, no partner had enough incentive
to burden its own powerful stakeholders.185 And without sufficient cause
to believe that WQSs in the Bay might finally be attained, the incentives
would also fail. So only the federal government—whether by its courts,
President or other authority—could fashion the solution.186 But that
solution is needed in more places than the Chesapeake.
In May 2009, Executive Order 13508 was issued, creating a “fed-
eral leadership committee” chaired by EPA, and ordering it to develop a
181 Section 117 directs/empowers EPA to “ensure that management plans are developed
and implementation is begun” by the partners. 33 U.S.C. § 1267(g)(1). EPA, recognizing
this aspect of § 117, demanded implementation plans from the states that were party to
the 2000 Agreement and requested them from the others in planning the TMDL. When
it was defending its actions in AFBF, EPA’s brief relied upon § 117—while also arguing
that everything done in the TMDL and in support of the TMDL was “consistent with”
CWA § 303(d). See EPA’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and in Support of EPA’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Am. Farm
Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, No. 1:11-CV-0067 (M.D. Pa. 2012), at 43.
182 See supra note 148.
183 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d 289, 325 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (citing both
§§ 117 and 303 as “support” for the TMDL).
184 Although plaintiffs had argued that establishing LA/WLAs for upstream watershed
states was illegal, the court rightly related Bay water quality to tributary flow, especially
that of the Susquehanna River and its massive watershed. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n,
984 F. Supp. 2d at 329–32 (citing Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992)). Oddly, the
plaintiffs had argued that EPA should only be allowed to control NPDES permitting in
the upstream states, see id. at 332 n.23, which is precisely the kind of “coercion” EPA
used in setting the TMDL’s gross allocations imposed on those states. See infra notes
217–81 and accompanying text.
185 Cf. Steinzor & Jones, supra note 149, at 53 (arguing that Pennsylvania has always been
insufficiently motivated to participate and that Maryland and Virginia, while they bemoan
the fact, find Pennsylvania a “convenient scapegoat and plausible cover for their own lack
of progress, delaying the hard choices they must also make if the Bay is to be restored.”).
186 The Third Circuit rejected the Farm Bureau’s appeal on precisely these grounds as
well. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 299–301 (3d Cir. 2015).
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“strategy for coordinated implementation of existing programs and
projects.”187 It further ordered that the strategy, “to the extent permitted
by law . . . define environmental goals for the [Bay] and describe mile-
stones for making progress toward attainment of these goals.”188 This
was the beginning of the “accountability framework” the federal govern-
ment has sought in the Chesapeake. The final strategy released in May
2010189 aimed to have 60% of all Bay segments attaining the applicable
WQSs by 2025,190 to have 70% of sampled streams throughout the water-
shed rate well under the Index of Biotic Integrity by 2025,191 to restore
30,000 acres of wetlands in the watershed by 2025192 and to restore riparian
forest buffers to 63% (181,000 miles) of all riparian miles in the water-
shed by 2025,193 among other goals. All of the TMDL’s goals are similarly
pegged to 2025.194
The President’s statutory and constitutional powers to issue such
an order raise hard questions of degree. Had the White House ordered EPA
to make affirmative “necessity” determinations under CWA § 303(c)(4)195—a
provision empowering the Administrator to do so—the President would
187 Exec. Order No. 13508, Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration, 74 Fed. Reg. 23099,
23100 (2009). The other lead agency, the Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), administers
the wetlands reserve, “swampbuster” and other agriculture-subsidy programs. See Jacob
Hughes, Dredged, Filled, Plowed, and Planted: The Deficiencies of Wetland Protection in
the United States, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 619, 631–40 (2013).
188 Executive Order 13508, Chesapeake Bay Protection and Restoration, 74 Fed. Reg. at
23100.
189 See FEDERAL LEADERSHIP COMM., EXEC. ORDER 13508: STRATEGY FOR PROTECTING AND
RESTORING THE CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED (2010) [hereinafter STRATEGY]. The Strategy
also references the Bay TMDL at length, intertwining its goals, both in water quality and
in other metrics, with those of the TMDL.
190 Id. at 4. By then, eighty-nine of ninety-two Bay segments were listed as “impaired.” Id.
191 Id. at 22.
192 Id. at 49.
193 Id. at 51.
194 A fourth Agreement among the watershed governors in June 2014 similarly set 2025
as the relevant deadline. Critically, the 2014 Agreement only aimed to have “60 percent
of the nutrient and sediment pollution load reductions necessary to achieve applicable
[WQSs] compared to 2009 levels” in place by 2025—not that 60% of Bay segments would
actually meet their applicable WQSs by then. See the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agree-
ment 2014 at ‘Water Quality Goals and Outcomes.’ Given the uncertainty separating
LA/WLAs and WQSs attainment, the Agreement’s commitments, thus, seem less ambitious
than the TMDL’s. See infra notes 295 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the Agreement
referenced the TMDL and its implementation plans as “the foundation for water quality
improvements embodied in this Agreement.” Id. And the TMDL aims to have 60% of
needed actions completed by 2017. See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at ES-1.
195 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4).
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arguably be encroaching upon Congress’s power to choose who shall make
a judgment that is as much environmental science as intergovernmental
politics.196 On the other hand, the President, who under Article II, § 3 must
“take care that the laws be faithfully executed,”197 often sets priorities
among many laws to be executed given resource constraints.198 May the
President (or EPA) set 2025 as the target date for a little more than half of
the Bay’s impaired waters to meet their WQSs? That seems less like law
enforcement than an order to subordinates that they ignore §§ 303(d)–(e).199
Even assuming the executive order itself is immune from judicial re-
view,200 any directives issued by its “leadership committee” or any of its
component agencies acting pursuant to that order would be reviewable.201
This is where permanently provisional environmental quality norms
like WQSs render the often porous boundary between lawmaking and
196 See supra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
197 U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3.
198 See OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY’S AU-
THORITY TO PRIORITIZE REMOVAL OF CERTAIN ALIENS UNLAWFULLY PRESENT IN THE
UNITED STATES AND TO DEFER REMOVAL OF OTHERS, 38 OP. O.L.C. 1, 6–7 (2014) [herein-
after OLC Memo on DACA].
199 Cf. id. at 7 (“[T]he Executive Branch ordinarily cannot . . . ‘consciously and expressly
adopt[ ] a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory
responsibilities.’ ”) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 n.4 (1985)). Note that
agencies which use “general statements of policy” as a means of articulating internal
norms, where those norms end up binding agency personnel, must ordinarily treat those
rules as “legislative” in nature. See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996).
200 There is no presumption of reviewability where the President’s actions are concerned.
See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 501 (1866); Chicago & Southern Air Lines v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 108–14 (1948); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731
(1982); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796–801 (1992); Dalton v. Specter, 511
U.S. 462, 468–77 (1994). And the Supreme Court has held that the Administrative
Procedure Act’s cause of action does not reach the President. Id. at 468–69. Finally,
simpler paths to court seem inapposite to 13508, although a variety of nonstatutory
possibilities arguably remain. See Kevin Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s
Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1192–1212 (2009) (arguing that a variety of
nonstatutory forms of ultra vires review remain valid even after the APA’s effective bar
to the review of presidential action under the standard forms of statutory review).
201 Agency rulemakings have become subject to a rather flexible presumption of review-
ability under the APA. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967);
Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 387 U.S. 167, 170 (1967); cf. Ronald M. Levin, The Story of the
Abbott Labs Trilogy: the Seeds of the Ripeness Doctrine, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES
431, 477 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2005) (“[O]nce the Court had made clear that there was
no presumption against pre-enforcement review, a combination of factors . . . induced
courts to find that the Abbott Labs balance favors such review in most instances.”).
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law enforcement more trouble perhaps than it is worth. Ideally, the bound-
ary serves accountability’s purposes and checks the abuse of power.202
But where “execution” consists in “mingled assessments of fact, policy,
and law”,203 which are both constitutive of and uniquely fit to an adminis-
trator’s discretion, the mere act of organizing the discretion into a de-
tailed plan, publicly transmitted to subordinates with clear instructions
on how to prioritize limited resources,204 cannot be illegal per se. And yet,
the rule of law in our traditions demands at least that this kind of “execu-
tion” not be per se immune from judicial review either.205 Refining an
account of this spectrum that enables appropriate review and real ac-
countability is one of Parts III and IV’s burdens. The other is describing
how that needle was threaded in the Chesapeake where an unprece-
dented investment has been made in organizing multiple sovereigns
around a continuously evolving set of environmental quality goals.
III. WHEN THE LAW AND ITS GOALS CO-EVOLVE
Pollution statutes like the CWA are known for leaving to (or vest-
ing in) states the presumptive right to balance the benefits and costs of
regulating particular source categories or firms—whatever the goal(s).
Their role has traditionally been to do the equally political and technical
job of picking regulatory targets—those who will face stringent regula-
tion. Their challenge stems from having to balance disparate social and
economic factors. When states subtly shift this role to one of protecting
their sources from stringent controls and letting others bear the brunt of
the costs, cooperation fails. The Chesapeake TMDL regimented this dis-
cretion but not, as Part IV argues, in any way contrary to law. Indeed, the
plan in the Chesapeake suggests an innovative, effective way to engineer
our federal-state relations and their interrelated authorities to say what
the law is. This should be of wider interest given how many of our biggest
environmental problems today share the Chesapeake’s basic features.
202 See HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCES OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 73–76 (2006).
203 OLC Memo on DACA, supra note 198, at 7.
204 Part III argues that the TMDL and its associated planning tools did just this. See infra
notes 239–41 and accompanying text.
205 See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 25–57 (Liberty
Fund, Inc., 2d ed. 1998).
2016] COERCING COLLABORATION 709
A. The Chesapeake’s Watershed Implementation Plans:
Numbers that Bind?
The Farm Bureau argued, quite plausibly, that the Chesapeake
TMDL is different because its numbers—the allocations of pollutants
within the “total” load—bind the partnering states.206 But what does bind-
ing mean here? Were the partners legally obliged by the TMDL? Neither
Section 117 nor Section 303 gives EPA that authority in so many
terms.207 But what of the consequences of failing to meet the TMDL’s
scheduled targets?208 A general “compliance and enforcement strategy”
announced targeting the Chesapeake watershed209 was one thing. But a
detailed, explicit tit for tat, like EPA Region III published in December
2009, was something else altogether.210 That letter seemed to coerce—
and quite effectively.211 The right to submit better information and seek re-
vision of a norm, i.e., what the district court believed kept the TMDL from
being “binding,”212 does not make it any less obligatory. Every law can be
206 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 984 F. Supp. 2d 289, 316–33 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
The district court concluded that neither EPA’s “backstop measures” nor the WLAs and LAs
are “binding on the states.” Id. at 325. In a separate case, plaintiffs Friends of the Earth and
others argued that the TMDL, by coercing the jurisdictions into using pollution trading
schemes, would create uneven water quality in the watershed and thereby harm their
members. The district court rejected their claims as failing to raise an Article III “injury
in fact,” mostly because—in the court’s view—the TMDL was not sufficiently mandatory
or coercive. See Food and Water Watch v. U.S. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62 (D.D.C. 2013).
207 Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 984 F. Supp. 2d 289, 299–301, 313–14, 324–26.
208 Under § 303(d), any EPA-created TMDL is, in some sense, “binding” on the subject
state that either refused or failed to submit a satisfactory TMDL. Cf. Pronsolino v. Marcus,
91 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (state acknowledging the consequences that
could follow from its failing to “implement” EPA’s TMDL).
209 See U.S. EPA OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, CHESAPEAKE BAY
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY (May 2010) [hereinafter OECA STRATEGY].
210 Sophisticated players in a repeat-play, non-zero-sum game where the choices are either
to cooperate or to defect have available to them a wide variety of possible strategies. See
DAVIS, supra note 40, at 146–47. The dominant strategy, however, is to cooperate until
a partner defects, to sanction a defecting partner but resume cooperation as soon as pos-
sible, and—as long as one’s partner is not acting at random—to elevate the severity of
sanctions in response to the severity of the partner’s defection(s). Id. at 147–48. This
came to be known as the “tit-for-tat” strategy. Id.
211 Cf. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (reviewing correspondence between
EPA and partners conveying a sense of coercive sanctions for failures to generate, pursue,
or accomplish the WIP goals).
212 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 327. Likewise, the court hearing the chal-
lenge to the TMDL for its treatment of pollution trading found, on its way to concluding
the plaintiffs lacked standing, that the TMDL did not “coerce States into implementing any
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revised.213 What EPA did was constrain the states by manipulating the
burdens of uncertainty in a particularly shrewd way. It pooled the jurisdic-
tions’ own best available information as to both sources and their relative
potency, dared them to do better than it had in figuring an overall pollu-
tion “diet,” and announced a collective dieting plan backed by leverage
EPA most assuredly possesses: the authority to enforce the CWA and its
regulations intentionally and purposefully in proportion to any partner’s
failure(s).214 The plan’s being public made the “accountability” as much
horizontal as vertical.215 And the partners have followed the TMDL jointly
and severally.216 To call the Chesapeake TMDL “nonbinding,” thus, is to
ignore a great deal about this experience that may prove quite valuable
beyond its borders.
The TMDL’s specificity and determinacy is what sources (and
many state officials) found so menacing.217 By resolving pollutant alloca-
tions and caps down to the sub-basin, estimating extant contributors
sectorally and, in some cases, individually, and calculating how they
would all have to compensate if the criteria were to be attained, EPA’s
programs they would not consider implementing on their own.” See Food & Water Watch
v. EPA, 5 F. Supp. 3d 62, 78 (D.D.C. 2013).
213 Cf. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1372 (2012) (“The mere possibility that an agency
might reconsider in light of “informal discussion” and invited contentions of inaccuracy
does not suffice to make an otherwise final agency action nonfinal.”).
214 See infra notes 215–25 and accompanying text. Even the district court acknowledged
that it was a close call. See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 324 (“Although
there may be a fine line between collaboration and coercion, the court finds this frame-
work to be more indicative of collaboration.”).
215 Region III’s “consequences letter” tracked in substance, if not in form, an earlier draft
report from EPA headquarters on “tools and actions” as ordered by Executive Order
13508. See U.S. EPA, THE NEXT GENERATION OF TOOLS AND ACTIONS TO RESTORE WATER
QUALITY IN THE CHESAPEAKE BAY: A DRAFT REPORT FULFILLING SECTION 202A OF EX-
ECUTIVE ORDER 13508 (Sept. 2009) [hereinafter TOOLS AND ACTIONS REPORT] (copy on file
with author); see letter from William C. Early, Acting Regional Administrator, U.S. EPA
Region III, to The Hon. L. Preston Bryant, Jr., Secretary of Nat. Res., Va. (Nov. 4, 2009)
[hereinafter Consequences Letter].
216 The 2014 Chesapeake Bay Watershed Agreement calls the TMDL the “foundation for
water quality improvements embodied in th[e] Agreement.” See CHESAPEAKE WATERSHED
AGREEMENT 2014, available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/chesapeakebaywatershed
agreement/page [https://perma.cc/5FXV-N78M].
217 In their amicus brief on appeal, the states complained at length that EPA exceeded its
statutory authority in setting detailed allocations and demanding the assurances it did.
See Brief of the States et al. in Support of Reversal, supra note 174, at 33–59. Interest-
ingly, AFBF eventually abandoned the argument that the allocations’ detail invalidated
them in favor of the argument that their being fixed and “locked in” invalidated them. See
Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. EPA, 984 F. Supp. 2d 289, 316–17 n.316 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
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TMDL orchestrated an ecosystem-wide plan, comprised of seven distinct
sub-plans.218 Deviation would be met with sanctions, like most laws.219
Many TMDLs simply recapitulate an underlying WQS’s deficits, failing
to generate any real action or accountability.220 Rounding out its “conse-
quences letter” detailing expectations for the Bay jurisdictions’ Water-
shed Implementation Plans (“WIPs”), EPA recited eight “options” from
its existing authorities which it could exercise in the event a jurisdiction
faltered.221 All of the options stemmed from authority the CWA vests in
EPA222 and six were some form of tightening standards on that jurisdic-
tion’s point sources.223 To an extent, these were reminders of discretion
EPA clearly retains.224 And they were likely unreviewable as such.225
218 Vital to the plan, but omitted from my discussion for purposes of space, was EPA’s
commitment to significantly reduce the atmospheric deposition of nitrogen throughout
the watershed—a federal commitment made in the TMDL itself. See Consequences
Letter, supra note 215, at 6. Air deposition, estimated to contribute up to 30% of the Bay’s
nitrogen, could otherwise have remained a convenient excuse for some.
219 Coercive sanctions for noncompliance, though perhaps neither necessary nor sufficient
properties of law, are nevertheless pervasive and characteristic thereof. See FREDERICK
SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 124–39 (2015).
220 Skeptics have long argued that setting environmental quality norms is more trouble
than it is worth. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN ET AL., THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH FOR ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY (1974). Without the administrator’s confidence that the norm is
worth attaining, though, a norm like a WQS is even less useful. See Adler, supra note 82,
at 788–89. Beginning with the 2009 Tools and Actions report, EPA was determined to
replace “voluntary efforts” by partners with “strong commitments by all six watershed
states and [D.C.] because achieving [WQSs] in the Bay requires significant reductions in
loads from all source sectors throughout the Bay’s watershed and airshed.” TOOLS AND
ACTIONS REPORT, supra note 215, at 15.
221 See Letter from William C. Early, Acting Regional Administrator to The Honorable
Preston L. Bryant, Jr., Secretary of Natural Resources of Virginia (Dec. 29, 2009) (Enclosure
B). A subsequent guidance document of April 2010 set out the expected elements of the
Phase I WIPs. See U.S. EPA, A GUIDE FOR EPA’S EVALUATION OF PHASE I WATERSHED
IMPLEMENTATION PLANS (Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter PHASE I WIP GUIDANCE], and then
another a year after that did so for Phase II WIPs. See U.S. EPA, GUIDE FOR CHESAPEAKE
BAY JURISDICTIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHASE II WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION
PLANS (Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter PHASE II WIP GUIDANCE].
222 See TOOLS AND ACTIONS REPORT, supra note 215, at 15–18, 20–40.
223 Option 1 is a representative example. It threatened to expand NPDES permit coverage to
“currently unregulated sources” such as concentrated animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”),
smaller animal feeding operations (“AFOs”) and small municipal separate storm sewer
systems (“MS4s”). See Consequences Letter, supra note 215, at 8 (Enclosure B Option 1).
224 One exception may have been the options discussing CAFO permitting. EPA has en-
countered great resistance to regulating CAFOs—of whatever size—and may not do so
without clear proof of an operation’s discharge of pollution to jurisdictional waters. See,
e.g., National Pork Producers Council v. U.S. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 749–56 (5th Cir. 2011).
225 Such “enforcement discretion,” not having been previously constrained by rule, was
most likely “committed to agency discretion by law,” and thus not subject to the APA
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CWA § 301(b)(1)(C) requires that every NPDES permit’s effluent
limits be as stringent as necessary to meet applicable WQSs,226 and CWA
§ 301(a) logically reaches any “point source,” no matter how trivial.227
Congress may not have been aware of the diversity of threats to water
quality beyond point sources when it legislated the CWA, but until it
amends § 301, that is its reach.228 EPA has for decades crafted rules
setting size thresholds for NPDES permitting with sources like concen-
trated animal feeding operations (“CAFOs”),229 commercial and industrial
sites230 and oil and gas drilling.231 It has made the permitting of munici-
pal storm sewers into a summary, largely self-executing affair.232 And it
has deferred to states in their selection of effluent limitations for publicly
owned treatment works (“POTWs”) where it might have insisted that a
“more stringent limitation” be imposed.233 Each of these norms, however,
has come with the caveat that applicable WQSs might necessitate
stricter controls.234 And the threat that such relative immunities would
be replaced by targeted and searching EPA scrutiny, like a threat that
cause of action. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition
Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986); see infra notes 398–401 and accompanying text.
226 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
227 Cf. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“Except as in compliance with [standards EPA is authorized
to set] the discharge of any pollutant [from any “point source”] by any person shall be
unlawful.”).
228 At least, that is, until EPA adopts regulations confining the reach of the term “point
source” which withstand the inevitable legal challenges. See, e.g., Decker v. Northwest
Envtl. Defense Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
229 See Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 492–93 (2d Cir. 2005)
(reviewing EPA’s history of regulating only the largest CAFOs).
230 See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean
Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 429–32 (2007).
231 Id. at 431–32; see also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Flowback: Federal Regulation of Wastewater
from Hydraulic Fracturing, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 215, 283–317 (2014).
232 Cf. Environmental Defense Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 852–58 (9th Cir. 2003)
(remanding portions of EPA’s Phase II Stormwater Rule for failure to provide an ade-
quate public hearing in compliance with CWA §§ 301 and 402); Natural Res. Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, 966 F.2d 1292, 1305–06 (9th Cir. 1992) (remanding EPA’s exclusion
of construction sites of less than five acres from original stormwater rule as inadequately
justified). The “Phase II” municipal separate storm sewer system (“MS4”) permitting
rules, which apply to “small regulated” systems, provide for relatively minimal permit
conditions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B); 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.33–34 (2014).
233 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
234 For MS4s, EPA requires that any permitting authority retain the right to designate
otherwise exempt small MS4s as “regulated” MS4s should local conditions demand it. See
40 C.F.R. 122.26(a)(9). This “residual designation authority” is specifically protected in
the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 402(p)(2)(E).
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deference will be denied in setting WQSs,235 was as much leverage as
reminder.236 It put a jurisdiction’s point sources (stakeholders) in jeop-
ardy of suffering disadvantage vis-à-vis their counterparts and, thus,
changed their posture toward the host jurisdiction. The same strategic
dynamics that had previously locked in the watershed’s collective inac-
tion became each jurisdiction’s own penalty for default.237 The conse-
quences letter, thus, put a certain force behind EPA’s demands for the
WIPs and their implementation.238
235 The eighth option of the Consequences Letter—“Federal Promulgation of local nutrient
water quality standards”—first noted that “the Bay watershed [jurisdictions] generally
have narrative nutrient criteria to protect local, fresh water stream water quality.” See
Consequences Letter, supra note 215, at 12. It then made the threat explicit: “EPA
regulations require the States or the District to adopt water quality criteria that are
sufficient to protect the designated use, . . . [sic] In its review of the States or the District’s
water quality standards, EPA may determine that a jurisdiction’s local water quality
criteria do not protect local or downstream designated uses . . . . EPA has the authority
to promulgate federal standards where EPA has made a determination that existing . . .
[WQSs] are not sufficient to protect the designated water uses. EPA may use this
authority to promulgate numeric criteria for nutrients as appropriate” [citations omitted].
236 See, e.g., Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. v. Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(finding that agency communication to the regulated party was reviewable because “legal
consequences” attached once the regulated party would have to risk an enforcement action
and subsequent liability in acting contrary to the agency’s guidance).
237 With each jurisdiction having disclosed in its WIPs where it believed the major sources
were to be found, it notified its peers (and EPA) where its actions had to focus and, at least
approximately, how to target its own limited enforcement resources. This, in turn, em-
powered those others to monitor the discloser’s enforcement discretion. See DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 89 (1994). EPA, thus, linked both large and small
scale implementation choices to developments in the field as monitored by third parties—
something adaptive managers have long advocated. See Carl J. Walters & C.S. Holling,
Large-Scale Management Experiments and Learning by Doing, 71 ECOLOGY 2060 (1990).
238 Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 219, at 127–39 (arguing that the force of law is less about its
adherents having personally internalized the law’s mandates than it is about legal insti-
tutions’ uses of coercive measures to assure everyone’s compliance). Quite unlike most other
cooperative federalist schemes where EPA is empowered to sanction underperforming
states, the Consequences Letter shrewdly set out a variety of measures to account for the
variations across the watershed and among the political leadership’s priorities in the
different jurisdictions. This was more advantageous to EPA than sanctions so big they
are practically unusable or so small that they neither motivate others nor correct for their
deficiencies. See DAVIS, supra note 40, at 148 (noting the importance in tit-for-tat strate-
gies of not allowing any defection to go unpunished). EPA’s advantage thereafter became
each jurisdiction’s assurance against its peers’ defection. Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 219,
at 91–92 (arguing that any law governing officials “exists in part to keep bad officials
from doing bad things, but it also, and more importantly, exists to keep good officials
from doing what they think are good things, or may even be good things in the short run,
to the detriment of the long-run public interest.”).
714 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:677
What were those demands? By phased approach, EPA directed each
jurisdiction to distribute its nutrient and sediment target loads set out in
the draft TMDL, to track and verify reductions of existing and to offset fu-
ture loads, and to set program milestones “to allow EPA to assess prog-
ress . . . and determine whether federal actions may be warranted . . . .”239
In short, the TMDL’s explicit numbers pushed the states to make definite
plans, which they could and would execute, shifting the burdens of
uncertainty onto the states. When draft Phase I WIPs arrived, EPA found
that only two of the seven jurisdictions’ drafts would meet nitrogen and
phosphorus goals and only five would meet the sediment goals.240 After
being remanded back with this EPA feedback, the jurisdictions’ final
Phase I WIPs were completed and incorporated into the TMDL’s own
gross LA/WLA assumptions at the end of 2010.241
Phase II WIPs were due quickly thereafter, again based on guid-
ance provided by EPA from, among other things, its models.242 Taking
what it had learned from the Phase I WIPs, EPA then doubled down on
the strategy, informing the jurisdictions that much of what was “neces-
sary to meet the Bay TMDL allocations will be implemented at the local
level by partners including conservation districts, local governments, plan-
ning commissions, utilities and watershed associations.”243 So Phase II
WIPs were to detail the jurisdictions’ planned “collaboration with these
key local partners.”244 The WIPs were to explain in detail how these “part-
ners are going to reduce loads delivered to the Bay” and give them an
“opportunity” to “identify what resources, authorities and assistance they
need to implement actions that achieve their respective share of the Bay
jurisdictions’ WIP strategies and TMDL allocations.”245 Phase II WIPs
239 See PHASE I WIP GUIDANCE, supra note 221, at 1.
240 See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 8.0.
241 See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 7.2.
242 See PHASE II WIP GUIDANCE, supra note 221, at 1 (“EPA’s role is to provide support
and technical guidance, ensure that the Phase II WIPs provide at least as strong a
demonstration of reasonable assurance as in the Phase I WIPs, and assess whether any
refinements to the Bay TMDL are necessary.”).
243 See PHASE II WIP GUIDANCE, supra note 221, at 2.
244 Id. Maryland’s “very strong county government system,” for example, means counties
“make many decisions regarding land use, zoning and development, implementation of
stormwater permits, and construction and operation of wastewater treatment plants that
are critical to water quality in general and to the Bay Restoration.” MARYLAND’S PHASE
II WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE CHESAPEAKE BAY TMDL 59 (Oct. 2012)
[hereinafter MARYLAND’S PHASE II WIP].
245 PHASE II WIP GUIDANCE, supra note 221, at 2.
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were to set definite, quantified goals resolving the gross segment alloca-
tions from the watershed model down to particular locations and sectors.246
But they were also to plan out execution to 2017, making the “two-year
milestones” required of the jurisdictions key to accountability—key to
everyone’s “reasonable assurances.”247 Reasonable assurances took the
form of detailed targets, defined timelines and a credible threat of conse-
quences for failure.248
Of course, as constraints develop, regulated parties often push
back, sometimes with information aimed at undermining the reasoning
identifying them as the target. This can be deliberative and healthy.249
The CWA arguably expects states to find the best means, i.e., whom to
target, in pursuing WQSs.250 The assumption always was that the WIPs—
especially given their phased approach and, thus, a built-in excuse to put
costly measures off to the future—would involve deeply political choices.251
But as the process unfolded, ostensible losers have identified their own
246 Id. at 3.
247 EPA’s “reasonable assurances” demands never differentiated between interstate and
intra-state situations, although an “applicable” WQS can be that of a downstream state.
See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 107 (1992).
248 The TMDL included 33 pages of allocations by segment, pollutant, and source cate-
gory. See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 9.1. For example, Maryland’s Phase II
WIP, which included WIPs from each of its counties and the City of Baltimore, was built
around what it called the Maryland Assessment and Scenario Tool (“MAST”), a simplified
version of the Chesapeake watershed model allowing state and local agencies to explore
alternative reduction scenarios. See MARYLAND’S PHASE II WIP, supra note 244, at 4.
MAST generates both outputs helping planners to try alternative scenarios among its
major sectors and “input decks” therefrom to be fed back into the Bay watershed model.
Id. According to the state, “[u]sing MAST to develop local Phase II WIP strategies has
illustrated the practicality and transparency of modeling. It has empowered stakeholders
by enabling them to see the underlying input information and quickly predict the results
of their proposed load reduction strategies. . . . The process of utilizing the MAST tool to
mimic the EPA watershed model has also led to some further refinements in the EPA
model.” Id. at 4–5. Its major sectors are agriculture, forest, wastewater, septic and
stormwater.
249 Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information-Forcing Environmental Regulation, 33 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 861, 875–93 (2006) (arguing that strong, categorical controls can act as a
“penalty default” for the regulated parties possessing the best information and incentivize
them to share that information, improving the public’s understanding of and approach
to environmental quality problems).
250 See Adler, supra note 79, at 209–30.
251 See, e.g., Zach Kaufman et al., Agricultural Costs of the Chesapeake Bay Total Maxi-
mum Daily Load, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 14131, 14132 (2014) (“Significant concerns have 
emerged about the costs of achieving the Chesapeake Bay TMDL [with Phase II WIPs in
place] and who will pay for them.”).
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best target: the Bay model and the thousands of assumptions enabling
its computations.252 A well-worn trench aligns those working to define
and refine the “best available science” against those who would be sad-
dled with the costs of any solutions their science suggests.253 The no-
man’s land in between is held, increasingly, by models.
Take, for example, the Delmarva poultry industry which, in concert
with the Farm Bureau, seems to have fought virtually every step Mary-
land and Delaware have taken to control poultry manure,254 the Bay’s
single largest source of phosphorus.255 By amendments to their feed, their
animals’ genetics and their rearing practices, producers claim the phos-
phorus content of their manure is significantly below average.256 Because
the CBP modelers used standard averages to calculate phosphorus tonnage
from the volume of chickens being produced in the region,257 it was a coarse
estimate underlying the Eastern Shore phosphorus allocations. Accord-
ing to some data gathering by an engineering professor at the University
of Delaware, though, CBP estimates were significantly higher than the
local results.258 Once this localized analysis went public, the chicken
252 Cf. Wagner et al., supra note 45, at 342 (“[D]iscrediting a model by picking at every
instance of error or uncertainty offers critics of regulation the easiest path to attack
policies based on model results when models are misunderstood as answer machines.”);
Paolisso et al., supra note 165, at S108 (“The practice of modeling is different in many
ways from traditional scientific research, and it poses a number of difficult questions.
First modeling is done on computers rather than in the laboratory or in the field.”).
253 Compare Kahan et al., supra note 46, at 1073 (“If risk disputes are really disputes over
the good life, then the challenge that risk regulation poses for democracy is less how to
reconcile public sensibilities with science than how to accommodate diverse visions of the
good within a popular system of regulation.”), with ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITU-
TION OF RISK 165 (2014) (“[G]roups of experts can suffer both from the pathologies
intrinsic to all group decision making—the “folly of (expert) crowds”—as well as patholo-
gies distinctive to professional expertise. Groups of experts may suffer from overconfidence,
technocratic myopia, false consensus, and insufficient motivation, to name only a few of
the relevant problems.”).
254 See Steinzor & Jones, supra note 149, at 55. Environmental groups have begun to step
up their own counter-offensives to the industry, though. See ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT,
PHOSPHORUS PROBLEM ON THE EASTERN SHORE (2014).
255 See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 4.6.1.
256 See Alison Fairbrother, Fowling the Bay? Media Reports Absolving Poultry Industry
of Pollution are Premature, THE PUBLIC TRUST PROJECT, May 31, 2013, available at
http://publictrustproject.org/blog/environment/2013/fowling-the-bay-media-reports
-absolving-poultry-industry-of-pollution-are-premature/ [https://perma.cc/57VR-JHJZ].
257 See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 4.6.1.
258 See Fairbrother, supra note 256. See also CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at
§ 4.6.1. Glancey has not published his data or analysis nor had them peer reviewed.
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industry had a meme.259 In using averaging techniques, CBP and the
TMDL were alleged to have overestimated the chicken manure threat.260
But precision cuts both ways. After decades of over-applying
chicken manure to croplands, many Eastern Shore soils are saturated
with phosphorus.261 Indeed, NRCS and others had begun work in 1990
on a site indexing tool using available information to evaluate the rela-
tive risk of phosphorus transport from agricultural fields.262 The Phos-
phorus Site Index (“PSI”) they built combined spatially explicit soil and
landscape characteristics into an averaged risk for off-site transport,
which could be combined with source characteristics for a loss risk rating.263
Further refinements of transport mechanisms, obstructions (such as
buffers) and “source characteristics” led to what was billed as a Phospho-
rus Management Tool (“PMT”).264 Under the rules Maryland regulators
drafted, farms where the risk of transport off-site was high enough would
be barred from applying chicken manure.265 This “tool,” which had fea-
tured in the state’s Phase II WIP,266 became a lightning rod in Maryland
politics where its implementation stalled.267 A Republican Governor made
259  See Jeff Montgomery, Study: Water Pollution from Poultry Farms Overestimated, USA
TODAY, May 15, 2013 (One Delaware Journal piece republished by USA Today).
260 Legal claims against modeling inaccuracies have long been a mixed bag. See Fisher
et al., supra note 45, at 259–62.
261 See, e.g., Peter Kleinman et al., Dynamics of Phosphorus Transfers from Heavily Manured
Coastal Plain Soils to Drainage Ditches, 62 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERV. 225 (2007). If soils
are saturated with phosphorus, crops cannot incorporate further applications and phos-
phorus transport off-site grows more likely. Id.
262 See generally J.L. Lemunyon & R.G. Gilbert, Concept and Need for a Phosphorus Assess-
ment Tool, 6 J. PROD. AGRIC. 483 (1993).
263 See Frank J. Coale et al., Accelerated Deployment of an Agricultural Nutrient Management
Tool: The Maryland Phosphorus Site Index, 31 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 1471, 1472–73 (2002).
264 The 2013 PMT became a series of eight equations and a scaling factor, made available
for farmer use and supported by the University of Maryland Extension. See Joshua M.
McGrath et al., University of Maryland Phosphorus Management Tool: Technical User’s
Guide, UNIV. OF MARYLAND EXTENSION, available at https://extension.umd.edu/sites/de
fault/files/_docs/articles/EB-405%20UMD%20Phosphorus%20Management%20Tool-Tech
nical%20Users%20Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/R523-FHQR] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
“Source characteristics” refer to the manure itself and a coefficient for its extractable
phosphorus. Id.
265 See Maryland Dep’t of Agric., Subtitle 20: Soil and Water Conservation: Notice of Pro-
posed Action, 41 Md. Reg. 1432, 1436 (2014).
266 See MARYLAND’S PHASE II WIP, supra note 45, at 51.
267 The O’Malley Administration tried three times to implement the PMT and was blocked
by the legislature’s Eastern Shore delegation. See Rona Kobell, Study: MD Phosphorus Rule
Could Cost $22–52 Million to Implement, BAY JOURNAL (Nov. 8, 2014), available at http://
www.bayjournal.com/article/study_md_phosphorus_rule_could_cost_2252_million_to_im
plement [https://perma.cc/GEW2-UXEY]. A final effort was a rider requiring the State
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the PMT his administration’s first reversal of the O’Malley Administra-
tion’s WIP.268 But once the data were collected and indexing was possible,
others joined the fray. A July 2014 analysis by the Environmental Integ-
rity Project showed phosphorus concentrations increasing in three of
eight Eastern Shore rivers from 2003–13.269 They attributed it to the
legacy of over-manuring croplands in those counties.270
Modeled values, injected into the fires of partisan politics, can
ignite chain reactions of attack and counter-attack which never actually
refine the estimative methods to which they pertain.271 The Hogan Ad-
ministration was able to delay the PMT, but it ultimately had no alterna-
tive. Theorists who argue these exchanges are “information forcing”272
should take a close look at the Chesapeake experience. Winners and
losers churn and uncertainty’s strategic value can be diminished.273 But
quantification is a hard game to win consistently.
Indeed, the gross phosphorus allocations to Maryland’s Eastern
Shore tributaries and Bay segments amount to about 5% of the total Bay-
wide reductions scheduled.274 Some of this is allocated to point sources,
to determine the PMT’s costs to farmers if implemented as proposed, a study that was
released in November 2014 to wide acclaim in the poultry industry and wide disparage-
ment among most others. Id.
268 See Rona Kobell, Newly Minted Maryland Governor Pulls Stronger Phosphorus Regs at
Last Moment, BAY JOURNAL (Jan. 21, 2015), available at http://www.bayjournal.com/arti
cle/newly_minted_maryland_governor_pulls_stronger_phosphorus_regs_hours_at_last
[https://perma.cc/6NA7-K46M]. In June 2015, the Hogan Administration quietly finalized
an “enhanced” PMT with minor changes and a promise to study the economic effects on
Maryland farmers.
269 See ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, Manure Overload on Maryland’s Eastern Shore, http://
environmentalintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/POULTRY-REPORT.pdf [https://perma
.cc/EZY4-73BU] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016).
270 See id.
271 Cf. Fisher et al., supra note 45, at 279–82 (observing that many models’ “evaluative
complexity” makes ex post scrutiny of their underlying data, assumptions or compu-
tations more difficult).
272 Cf. Karkkainen, supra note 249, at 891–92 (observing that the use of a formal TMDL
as a “penalty default” to spur necessary collaboration and experimentation in the Chesa-
peake should lead to the progressive refinement of everyone’s information on implementation
tools, costs, etc.).
273 Sequential challenges to a model may create what game theorists call “network ex-
ternalities,” i.e., network effects from an assumption/calculation’s being rejected prema-
turely (“excess momentum”) or from its being retained too long (“excess inertia”). BAIRD
ET AL., supra note 237, at 208–09. Because the challenges are sequential, it is possible for
them to take on a trajectory contrary to the interests of the group which does not reflect
the information available to all. Id. at 215.
274 A back-of-the-envelope count from the TMDL’s Table 9-2’s scheduled reductions from
segments CHSTF, CHSOH, CHSMH, EASMH, CHOTF, CHOOH, CHOMH2, CHOMH1,
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but not much.275 Thus, EPA’s options in response to the Eastern Shore
manure impasse become highly instructive—especially to those con-
vinced that EPA or the CBP are too bent on “collaboration” to be effec-
tive. EPA is without jurisdiction to restrict the spread of chicken manure
on croplands, even where it is convinced that that manure presents a
high risk of eventual transport to the Bay.276 EPA could perhaps begin
objecting to every municipal separate storm sewer (“MS4”) and POTW
permit on the Eastern Shore,277 forcing every “practicable” BMP on the
former278 and costly “enhanced nutrient recovery” on the latter.279 But
LCHMH, HNGMH, FSBMH, NANTF_MD, NANOH, NANMH, WICMH, MANMH, BIGMH,
POCTF, POCOH_MD, TANMH_HD, CB2OH, CB3MH, CB4MH, and CB5MH_MD yields
almost 185,000 pounds per year. That is 4.7% of the total phosphorus reductions needed
watershed wide (~3.92 million pounds).
275 In the segments listed in note 259, the LA (nonpoint) to WLA (point) ratio is typically
9:1 or higher. See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at § 9.1 (Table 9-2).
276 Nat’l Pork Producers Council v. EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 750–51 (5th Cir. 2011) (requiring
that EPA regulate CAFOs only where an “actual discharge” of a pollutant to navigable
waters is present); Service Oil, Inc. v. EPA, 590 F.3d 545, 550 (8th Cir. 2009) (invali-
dating EPA penalty order to construction site and holding that until there is a discharge
of a pollutant by a point source to a navigable water, there can be no violation of the
CWA; Alt v. EPA, 2013 WL 4520030 (N.D. W.Va. 2013).
277 Every MOA between an authorized state and the EPA region must provide EPA an
opportunity to object to any permit issued. See 40 C.F.R. § 123.44 (2014).
278 Small, Phase II MS4s—like virtually all of those on Maryland’s Eastern Shore—are
generally required to meet six “minimum control measures,” a unique standard stemming
from municipal storm sewers’ unique treatment in the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3).
EPA is there directed to “require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the
maximum extent practicable,” § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii), a control standard found nowhere else
in the Act. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit once concluded that this special provision effectively
immunized MS4s from the more general requirements of CWA § 301, i.e., compliance
with receiving waters’ WQS. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159, 1165
(9th Cir. 1999). EPA has implemented § 402(p)(3) with a complex set of defaults which
generally require permitted MS4s to select and implement measures from among a list
of approved management practices. With so many MS4s effectively unregulated, EPA can
proclaim that “[o]nly approximately two percent of the nitrogen, six percent of the phos-
phorus, and four percent of the sediment delivered to the bay through urban/suburban
storm water discharge outfalls are regulated by EPA and the Bay state under the NPDES
MS4 program.” OECA STRATEGY, supra note 209, at 8.
279 Under 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1), a POTW discharging to waters or downstream waters
where the applicable water quality standards are not being attained must be as strin-
gently controlled as is necessary to keep it from “contribut[ing]” to the nonattainment.
That regulation, already upheld over vehement objection, see Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v.
EPA, 996 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1993), directs permit writers confronting narrative water
quality criteria like Maryland’s to fashion whatever limits are actually calculated as
necessary to attain the applicable WQSs. See, e.g., In re Alexandria Lake Area Sanitary
Dist., 763 N.W.2d 303, 312–18 (Minn. 2009) (upholding permitting authority’s application
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would that capture enough phosphorus to offset the excess manure’s
contributions? Would it do so at an acceptable cost to EPA? It takes
program capacity to object sensibly to each such permit. Targeting a
larger population could dilute the sanction’s deterrent effect.280 In some
sense, though, the target is less about the ecosystem than about properly
motivating the jurisdictional “partners.”281 For that kind of accountabil-
ity, the targets’ political or economic salience with the jurisdictional
partners is probably most important.282 Section B explains how these
gaps have been bridged in the Chesapeake.
B. Continuously Becoming: Phased Data, Models and
Contributions
It is common knowledge that the Bay model is due for a major
“recalibration” in 2017.283 Indeed, even the Phase II WIPs were prepared
from a revision of the model (version 5.3.2284) used to calibrate the first
of § 122.44(d)(1) to NPDES permitting to leave effluent limitations in draft until TMDL
was completed and WLA was set).
280 Cf. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 36 (“Regulatory agencies have maximum
capacity to lever cooperation when they can escalate deterrence in a way that is respon-
sive to the degree of uncooperativeness . . . and to the moral and political acceptability
of the response.”).
281 Cf. Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM.
L. REV. 1385, 1387 (2011) (“[I]f the marginal cost of regulatory compliance by relatively
small . . . contributors exceeds the marginal benefits, exempting [them] may be advisable.
Not surprisingly, many statutes and regulations include exemptions for small actions or
entities.”) (internal citations omitted).
282 Cf. Bullman-Pozen & Gerkin, supra note 18, at 1266–68 (noting that delegation entails
reliance on the “servant” and that the mutual dependence that emerges is at least as
common in “cooperative federalism” as is any simple principal/agent relationship); Rubin,
The Myth of Accountability, supra note 56, at 2122 (“[A]dministrative hierarchies
typically display a feature that can be described as second-order accountability. Those
who supervise subordinates and hold these subordinates accountable in various ways, are
themselves accountable to those superior to them, and specifically, they are accountable
for the way in which they hold their subordinates accountable.”).
283 David Lewis’s logical exposition of “common knowledge” wherein for something be-
tween A, B, and C to constitute common knowledge it must be true that it is known to
A, B, and C, that A, B, and C know that it is known, and so on, see DAVID LEWIS, CON-
VENTION 52–57 (1969), alerted students of collective action to the strategic significance
of an infinite regression. Since no human agent can actually work through the infinity
of steps, what they must be doing cognitively is reaching their own logical results. Id. at
53. Yet their logic can be misleading in the presence of real agents, real states of belief/
knowledge, etc.
284 See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at 1–3.
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WIPs.285 Although virtually everyone is on the “adaptive management”
bandwagon, few distinguish it from run-of-the-mill trial and error and
even fewer distinguish that from the gradual accumulation of knowl-
edge.286 Thus, with everyone expected continuously to improve in pursuit
of ambient environmental quality goals—which must, themselves, rou-
tinely improve—it becomes exceedingly difficult to distinguish a partner’s
warranted adjustments from free-riding.287 Indeed, so little is known about
BMPs—their effectiveness, relative efficiencies, adoption rates, quality
controls, etc.—that years after becoming the Chesapeake’s core strategy,
they present the perfect cipher.288 With no shared metrics no one knows
how much confidence to put in any given level of (claimed) performance.289
285 See Linker et al., supra note 164, at 1–3.
286 The NRC found that, while “effective adaptive management involves deliberate
management experiments, a carefully planned monitoring program, assessment of the
results and a process by which management decisions are modified based on new knowl-
edge,” little evidence existed of its incorporation into CBP or partner operations. NRC
EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 121.
287 For example, Maryland’s Department of the Environment (“MDE”) knows that Pennsyl-
vania’s Department of Environmental Protection (“PADEP”) knows that the Bay model
is to be overhauled in 2017. And PADEP knows that MDE knows that it knows, etc. If
MDE generally believes that PADEP “has too little incentive to cooperate,” see Steinzor
& Jones, supra note 149, at 54, MDE should invest in monitoring PADEP—with, for
example, ambient concentration testing of the Susquehanna as it enters Maryland—on
the belief that PADEP is shirking. But the result, especially given the long lag times sep-
arating management measures and ambient water quality changes, would not neces-
sarily be a clearer picture of PADEP’s performance. Cf. NRC EVALUATION, supra note 10,
at 83 (concluding that NRC reviewers were “unable to determine the reliability and
accuracy of the BMP data reported by Bay jurisdictions” and unable “to quantify the
magnitude or the likely direction of the error introduced by BMP reporting issues”).
Moreover, even if neither PADEP nor MDE lose confidence in each other, other partners
may presume they have, thereby undermining their incentives.
288 Compare NRC EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 59–85, 113–23 (concluding that BMPs’
effectiveness and adoption is essentially unknown and that none of the Bay jurisdictions
have engaged in truly adaptive management to replace their uncertainties with infor-
mation), with Bernard W. Sweeney & J. Denis Newbold, Streamside Forest Buffer Width
Needed to Protect Stream Water Quality, Habitat, and Organisms: A Literature Review,
50 J. AMER. WATER RES. ASS’N 560, 566 (2014) (“[W]e found that [sic] nitrogen removal
per unit width of buffer varied inversely with subsurface water flux. Where water flux
is low, narrow buffers can provide high removal efficiencies, but such sites account for
relatively little of the watershed and regional-scale base flows in streams and, therefore,
can have relatively little effect on overall water quality.”).
289 Cf. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 120–21 (noting tendency of “enforced self-
regulation” to obscure needed comparability). Ignorance of the sort, however, can also be
useful if it disrupts whatever “common knowledge effects” might otherwise undervalue
contributions. See LEWIS, supra note 283, at 52–57.
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Standard metrics (which have yet to be derived) will have to ignore BMPs’
foremost influences: on-site conditions.290 What kind of collaboration
could justify heavy reliance on or trust in that sort of strategy?291
Decision-makers drawing on technical models are supposedly that
much harder to keep accountable.292 But when government-to-government
trust hinges on each other’s uses of modeled values within a wider frame-
work where the modeling both quantifies obligations and is repeatedly
called into doubt, the challenges shift significantly.293 Without sufficient
trust, peer-to-peer assurances can be prematurely discounted—instilling
doubts where none are warranted.294 The Chesapeake Bay experience
underscores the strategic positioning estimations invite295 and the damage
290 Sweeney and Newbold’s findings regarding published results on streamside buffers
underscore the point: any given practice can have dramatically different efficiencies
depending on site conditions. See Sweeney & Newbold, supra note 288, at 576. What little
long-term monitoring has been done suggests some BMPs are effective and some are not.
See NRC EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 115.
291 In October 2014, the CBP released a “verification framework” guidance collecting a
dozen “elements,” five “principles,” a schematic “verification lifecycle,” and a system of
accounting for BMPs broken out by sector and habitat type. It included 450+ pages of
appendixes. See Ches. Bay Prog., Strengthening Verification of Best Management Prac-
tices Implemented in the Chesapeake Bay Watershed: A Basinwide Framework (Oct. 2014)
[hereinafter Basinwide Framework]. Notably missing from this behemoth was any
explanation of its legal or regulatory force or its relationship to or authority under the
CWA. Rather subtly the guidance did note the CBP’s “Principals’ Staff Committee” had
voted to approve and adopt the “principles” at a December 2012 meeting. See id. at 10
n.14. It also (somewhat disingenuously) stated that Bay jurisdictions had been “required”
to “report BMP implementation data on an annual basis” to the CBP by EPA Region III.
Id. at 6 (citing the Consequences Letter which makes no mention of BMP verification).
292 See Fisher et al., supra note 45, at 278.
293 With WIPs and milestones predicated on the TMDL’s modeled values, and limited
capacities to fully model a jurisdiction’s planned actions within the CBP’s models, part-
ners face the double uncertainty of not knowing how an updated model will grade their
own works-in-progress and/or reshuffle other parties’ positions regarding work still to be
done. This makes for an especially fluid strategic situation, one where informal norms
can significantly reduce incentives to defect. See EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE EMER-
GENCE OF NORMS 30–37 (1977).
294 See Wagner et al., supra note 45, at 295.
295 See Paolisso et al., supra note 165, at S103 (“[T]he fact that all models consist of
hypothesized relationships can create a public credibility problem . . . but is viewed as
expected, normal and even an opportunity (for refinement) by scientists.”). Thus, where
the CBP experts see the opportunity for continuous improvements—improvements that
could help estuary work globally—the public may see strategic action. Cf. PA. DEP’T OF
ENVTL. PROT., PENNSYLVANIA CHESAPEAKE WATERSHED IMPLEMENTATION PLAN PHASE
2, at 4 (2012) [hereinafter PENN. PHASE II WIP] (“[R]ecalibrations demonstrate the
inaccuracies in the model [and therefore] reliance of [sic] this model to implement a
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even the threat of opportunism can do.296 It is not necessarily true that
“[t]he more assumptions that are fed into [a] model, the more likely the
model will produce inaccurate results.”297 It is true that mechanistic
models are only as good as our understanding of the mechanisms com-
prising them.298 The Bay model suggests that nitrogen loads from urban
runoff and septic systems grew almost 8% between 1985 and 2009,299 for
example, even though observed nitrogen concentrations decreased in some
of the most affected segments over that period.300 But is that because
concentrations lag behind actual discharges or because they were offset
by BMPs?301 The available evidence is and will probably remain inconclu-
sive long after the Chesapeake Bay’s fate has been decided.
Consider another example. The Bay model is predicated on the
belief that stream channel condition and sediment yield are strongly in-
fluenced by upland land use, a belief lately embroiled in renewed debate.302
It may be that legacy effects on streams, especially in this region, confound
regulatory program that imposes enforcement consequences as those described in [the
Consequences Letter] is wholly unjustified and arbitrary and capricious.”).
296 As the literature on coordination shows, participants need not actually engage in self-
serving behavior to deter others from contributing. Furthermore, assuming the Bay juris-
dictions’ interests do not coincide (precluding a coordination solution), the sequential nature
of their attacks on the CBP model allows them to learn, in essence, what game they are
playing. Cf. BAIRD ET AL., supra note 237, at 195 (“[I]t is easy to misidentify the game being
played. What appears to be a prisoner’s dilemma may be something else entirely.”).
297 ERNST, FIGHT FOR THE BAY, supra note 11, at 37. If Ernst was arguing that more as-
sumptions within a computational model introduce more risk of erroneous assumptions
and, hence, erroneous conclusions, then that may be true (although it is not necessarily true).
Cf. Wagner et al., supra note 45, at 337 (“Examples abound of agencies perpetuating the
misunderstanding of models as answer machines, while at the same time secretly
cramming contested, value-laden assumptions into their highly technical models behind
the scenes.”). But if Ernst means to argue that mathematically complex models are more
likely to be wrong simply because they are complex, then that is almost certainly false.
298 See Wagner et al., supra note 45, at 294–95.
299 See CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, BAY BAROMETER: A HEALTH AND RESTORATION
ASSESSMENT OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY AND WATERSHED IN 2009 (2010), available at
http://www.chesapeakebay.net/images/press_release_pdf/2009_Bay_Barometer_FINAL
_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/FXR9-FU6F].
300 Cf. Hirsch et al., supra note 161, at 871 (reinterpreting datasets from Patuxent River
to show flow-normalized trends).
301 Cf. NRC EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 115 (noting the importance of flow-weighted
concentration monitoring datasets for proper trend analysis).
302 See e.g., Dorothy Merritts et al., Anthropocene Streams and Base-Level Controls from
Historic Dams in the Unglaciated Mid-Atlantic Region, USA, 369 PHILOSOPHICAL TRANS-
ACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y A 976 (2011); Robert C. Walter & Dorothy J. Merritts,
Natural Streams and the Legacy of Water-Powered Mills, 319 SCIENCE 299 (2008).
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or even defeat the basic association.303 If so, the model will have to grow
still more complex in 2017, reconciling the presence of milldams and other
history with more general principles of geomorphology.304 This is less a re-
flection of adaptive management (or of uncertainties about BMPs),
however, than it is of geology and of knowledge’s accumulation over time.305
Finally, long neglected in BMP implementation has been any sys-
tematic or centralized collection of data on outcomes. This is something
CBP has been trying to fix,306 especially where the BMP is not publicly
cost-shared.307 Without such data, peer-to-peer trust in BMPs rests less on
adaptive management than something like “don’t ask, don’t tell.”308 With
so little to distinguish faithful performance from free-riding, though, EPA’s
options in judging the deployment of BMPs to meet TMDL obligations
303 See Walter & Merritts, supra note 302, at 300 (conjecturing that the immense number of
milldams in Pennsylvania’s Susquehanna basin from the 17th to the 19th century per-
manently altered the geomorphology of its streams and, thus, the sedimentation therein).
304 As Merritts and colleagues argue, “[i]f upland soil erosion were the dominant source
of sediment to streams, and if the resultant sediment loads were the predominant control
on channel geometry, then stream channels should be more stable after many decades
of soil-conservation practices. Yet, many streams in the [watershed] continue to be
unstable and degrading . . . .” Merritts et al., supra note 302, at 984.
305 Merritts and colleagues conclude from their case studies that restoring riparian wet-
lands buried beneath historic sediment, rather than restoring incised streams channels
or planting riparian trees, “could be a more effective and sustainable approach” to reducing
downstream sediment and nutrient transport. Id. at 1001. Whether the restoration work
in the Chesapeake should shift to alluvial wetlands restoration over forested stream
buffers, though, turns almost entirely on what confidence can be placed in Merritts et al.,
a study the authors themselves said only “raise[d] questions.” Id. at 1004.
306 Since 2003, the partners have been submitting their annual BMP data in a uniform
format EPA funds helped create. NRC EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 61. Still, though
partners may have a relatively “good understanding of wastewater discharges and state
cost-shared BMP” adoptions, id. at 62, various data privacy restrictions, data manage-
ment failures, and the inherent complexity and costs of field verification limit the part-
ners’ knowledge of BMP adoptions. Id. at 68–72. Without multiple, redundant methods for
locating BMPs and verifying their existence, varied counting practices result. See Caitlin
A. Grady et al., Locating Existing Best Management Practices Within a Watershed: The
Value of Multiple Methods, 49 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 883 (2013).
307 See NRC EVALUATION, supra note 10, at 68–83.
308 What little empirical research has been done does not support the claim that BMPs are
more likely to be adopted as a result of “collaboration” with landowners than they are from
other approaches. See Joseph T. Campbell et al., Does Collaboration Promote Grass-Roots
Behavior Change? Farmer Adoption of Best Management Practices in Two Watersheds, 24
SOC’Y & NAT. RES. 1127, 1137 (2011) (“Analysis indicates that farmers in a watershed with
grass-roots collaborative partnerships do not have higher rates of BMP adoption than
farmers in a watershed without a collaborative partnership. However . . . participants in
the partnership exhibited higher levels of BMP adoption than did nonparticipants in the
same watershed.”).
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are limited. The solution is not necessarily more information about its
estimates’ limitations;309 nor is it necessarily more “guidance” on BMP
assessment or verification.310 As a complex mechanistic (not statistical)
model, a single point estimate for the certainty/uncertainty with which
TMDL’s predictions are offered would be extremely difficult (if not im-
possible) to calculate, let alone communicate effectively.311 EPA, too, must
learn-by-doing, using the partners’ own best available information to
hold them accountable.312 Neither the CBP nor EPA has treated the Chesa-
peake TMDL models as “answer machine[s].”313 Yet, as Section C shows,
model uncertainty has become the default argument against WIP imple-
mentation and enforcement.
C. Collaboration’s Assurances: Ruining the Magic?
Pollution “trading” programs have long been billed as the way to
minimize the costs of its control.314 For example, with point sources
309 Even were EPA to risk the intergovernmental goodwill accrued by critically scruti-
nizing a partner’s claims of BMP implementation, there is no guarantee that it would
improve anyone’s incentives. It could just as easily reveal facts undermining assumptions
in the Bay model system and/or Scenario Builder and empower those who would delay
or derail implementation. For example, were EPA to discover that certain BMPs (e.g.,
streamside buffers) are less efficient than Scenario Builder assumes, it could face
litigation over the use of a model to “bind” regulated parties without the proper basis in
fact. Cf. McLouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(“The agency treated the model as conclusively disposing of certain issues . . . . On those
issues, EPA was simply unready to hear new argument. The model thus created a norm
with ‘present-day binding effect’ on the rights of . . . petitioners.”).
310 The Basinwide Framework, a CBP document, disclaims any effect on EPA’s “account-
ability role” in the seeking of “reasonable assurance[s]” under the TMDL and/or EPA’s
modes of verifying cost-shared and/or grant-funded implementation. See Basinwide Frame-
work, supra note 291, at 39–40.
311 See Paolisso et al., supra note 165, at S102–103. The low value of such information
should weigh against its being sought. Cf. PRESIDENTIAL/CONG. COMM’N ON RISK ASSESS-
MENT AND MGMT., FRAMEWORK FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH RISK MANAGEMENT, FINAL
REPORT: VOL. 1 (1997) (finding that estimations of uncertainty are unhelpful where “risk-
related decisions are routine, made at the local level, and do not involve large stakes.”).
312 Cf. Rubin, The Myth of Accountability, supra note 56, at 2132 (observing that account-
ability can be achieved in such circumstances because a “superior need not regard itself
as the sole source of policy initiatives, but may view itself as participating in a mutual
learning process with its subordinates” by using very general standards which are more
fully articulated by the subordinates as they progress).
313 Wagner et al., supra note 45, at 347–48 (calling this “the core misunderstanding” of
models).
314 This has been especially true with nutrients and polluted runoff. See, e.g., PAUL FAETH,
FERTILE GROUND: NUTRIENT TRADING’S POTENTIAL TO COST-EFFECTIVELY IMPROVE WATER
QUALITY 1–2 (2000). Several analysts have examined the Chesapeake experience from
726 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 40:677
paying farmers to adopt BMPs that achieve the same or better pollution
abatements than they themselves could, Pennsylvania’s program has
aimed to unite point and nonpoint sources in collective reductions at the
least cost.315 Calculating and verifying actual reductions in trades and
offsets, though, has arguably become as prescriptive as more traditional
tools. With the state’s TMDL obligations expressed in terms of gross
“loads” to the Susquehanna basin, its citizens’ ingenuity for reducing ex-
pected discharges at the least cost may be its richest resource.316 It must
first convince its partners that the reductions are real, though.
To verify reductions with reasonable assurances EPA has sought
detailed agreements between traders, an “uncertainty” ratio of 2:1 for
pollution abated to that allowed, quantified demonstrations of “baseline”
equivalence, representative sampling done at locations claiming to have
achieved the reductions, serious and transparent credit calculation re-
views and some means of ensuring credits’ “permanence,” i.e., that manage-
ment practices are conducted annually and not just at the outset.317 EPA
has insistently questioned Pennsylvania’s commitments to any of this.318
A skeletal “appendix” on offsets accompanied the TMDL,319 begging the
question whether its “assumptions and requirements”320 would govern
permittees too.321 But as early as 2012, EPA began asking Pennsylvania’s
Department of Environmental Protection (“PADEP”) hard questions
about the “baselines” of controls it had assumed for its credit program
and their consistency with the assumptions in the Bay TMDL model.322
Without proof of their equivalence, PADEP could easily make any farm’s
this perspective. See e.g., Lisa A. Wainger, Opportunities for Reducing Total Maximum
Daily Load (TMDL) Compliance Costs: Lessons from the Chesapeake Bay, 46 ENVTL. SCI.
& TECH. 9256 (2012).
315 Wainger, supra note 314, at 9260–61.
316 Cf. Wainger, supra note 314, at 9261–62 (showing that costs of compliance with TMDL
LAs and WLAs can, in theory, fall dramatically through the use of trading and offsets).
317 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION III, COMPONENTS OF CREDIT CALCULATION: EPA
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM (2014); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION III, ACCOUNTING
FOR UNCERTAINTY IN TRADING AND OFFSET PROGRAMS (2014).
318 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION III, PENNSYLVANIA’S TRADING AND OFFSET
PROGRAM REVIEW OBSERVATIONS (2012) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter REVIEW
OBSERVAIONS].
319 See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at App. S.
320 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(vii)(B) (2015).
321 See supra notes 68–72 and accompanying text.
322 See REVIEW OBSERVATIONS, supra note 318, at 3. Because Pennsylvania defined its credits
in terms of a “unit of compliance” as opposed to a quantity of pollutant, id. at 4, the “baseline”
in question turns on the extent of controls in place at the subject facility. Id. at 7.
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status quo look like cuts below the TMDL’s allocations.323 Being an up-
stream state, Pennsylvania is perhaps better situated to achieve its
reductions by offsets and trading than the tidal states.324 But PADEP’s
disagreements with EPA, together with EPA’s eventual “backstop” desig-
nation of Pennsylvania for its failure to make good on its commitments,325
have kept the trading genie mostly in the bottle.326
Pollutant trading, if it is to be done with reasonable assurances,
becomes every bit the prisoner of information and uncertainty as other,
more traditional tools.327 EPA’s flow of “technical memoranda,” released
by the CBP publicly to articulate its expectations of trading programs,
has arguably reprised the role its WIP guidance played in 2010 and
2011.328 In private correspondence between EPA Region III and PADEP,
these technical memos and EPA’s repeated objections to PADEP’s failure
to meet their particulars came to an impasse in fall 2014.329 PADEP had
complained that the Bay model was wrong,330 that legacy sediment in the
Susquehanna basin’s milldam-impacted streams was more serious than
323 See REVIEW OBSERVATIONS, supra note 318, at 6–10. The TMDL identified and assigned
WLAs to 183 “significant” sewage treatment works and 30 significant industrial wastewater
facilities in Pennsylvania. See CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at 9–20 – 9–28.
324 Water quality trading may be inherently limited in its capacity to reduce costs of
compliance if trades or offsets must occur within a single watershed. Cf. Dave Owen &
Colin Apse, Trading Dams, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1043, 1080–1102 (2015) (analyzing the
trade-offs and challenges of crediting one dam’s improvement or removal to some other’s
continued harms).
325 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF PENNSYLVANIA’S 2012–2013 AND 2014–2015 MILE-
STONES 2, 6–7 (2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/docu
ments/pa.pdf [https://perma.cc/S28S-KLLL].
326 The “transaction costs” that stem from uncertainty can easily become a bottleneck in
pollution trading schemes. See Robert N. Stavins, Transaction Costs and Tradeable Permits,
29 J. ENVTL. & ECON. MGMT. 133 (1995). PADEP counted only a handful of trades before
EPA’s intervention and PADEP’s own amendments to the trading program. The latest
adjustments will almost certainly make trades and offsets more difficult.
327 See SARA WALKER & MINDY SELMAN, WORLD RESOURCES INST. ISSUE BRIEF: ADDRESS-
ING RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN WATER QUALITY TRADING MARKETS (2014). The WRI report
confirms what the TMDL’s “Appendix S” had conveyed: that new or increased loads any-
where in the watershed, to be fully and effectively offset, must be “quantified using appro-
priate metrics” and the offsets must be “routinely verified to ensure that they are producing
expected reductions.” CHESAPEAKE TMDL, supra note 147, at S-3.
328 See EPA TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM ON TRADING AND OFFSETS, available at http://www
.epa.gov/reg3wapd/tmdl/ChesapeakeBay/EnsuringResults.html [https://perma.cc/8KLD
-CE4L].
329 See Letter from Kelly Jean Heffner, Deputy Sec., Penn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. to Jon
Capacasa, Director, Water Prot. Div., U.S. EPA Region III (Oct. 8, 2014) [hereinafter
Heffner Letter].
330 Id. at 3.
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believed,331 and that its experience with trading (nominally dating to 2005)
was being ignored.332 It threatened legal action, at least vaguely.333 But
as soon as EPA began objecting to NPDES permits utilizing a trade or off-
set, PADEP’s attention to the deficits EPA named was swift and focused.
PADEP’s complaint that EPA was enforcing mere “guidelines” as “require-
ments”334 was in vain; it amended its trading program, at least informally,
ostensibly addressing EPA’s concerns.335
The coercion in EPA’s approach may have been less motivating
than was the fact that the Susquehanna’s effects on the Bay are now so
long studied that EPA’s WQC and 2010 TMDL allocations were more
akin to math than to the collection plate at church.336 Then again, the
“model uncertainty” inherent in the Chesapeake Bay model system and
its hundreds of mechanisms remains substantial.337 Whatever the moti-
vation, Pennsylvania could not simply walk away from its WIPs this deep
into its promises to “collaborate,”338 promises that all the partners had
aimed directly into the TMDL and its implementation. So it is almost
certainly due at least in part to what underlay EPA’s position: the com-
mon need for “reasonable assurances” and the legal coupling of WQSs
with discharge permitting.339 Without both, EPA’s tactics would have
been more questionable.
331 PENN. PHASE II WIP, supra note 295, at 4.
332 Heffner Letter, supra note 329, at 3.
333 PENN. PHASE II WIP, supra note 295, at 4 (calling EPA’s model “legally suspect” and
“arbitrary and capricious”).
334 Heffner Letter, supra note 329, at 3. Pennsylvania might have challenged the use of the
technical memos as “rules” pursuant to the APA, although these memos’ place within EPA’s
“enforcement discretion” would have made any such claim a long shot. Cf. Reno v. American-
Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 490 (“[T]he Government’s enforcement
priorities and . . . the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible
to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake.”) (quoting Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985)); see infra note 344 and accompanying text.
335 See Pennsylvania Dep’t of Envtl. Protect., Wastewater Supplement to Phase 2 Watershed
Implementation Plan, Revised, Sept. 17, 2015, available at http://files.dep.state.pa.us
/Water/Wastewater%20Management/EDMRPortalFiles/Phase_2_WIP_Supplement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/92WC-LVSM].
336 Cf. Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 12, at 10–17 (arguing that pressures on peer juris-
dictions to publicly justify the positions they take will replace the conventional hierarchical
pressures to conform in any properly “experimentalist” ordering).
337 See supra notes 254–60 and accompanying text.
338 While the EPA/PADEP impasse was brewing, Pennsylvania was negotiating the latest
partnership agreement. See CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM, CHESAPEAKE WATERSHED
AGREEMENT 2014, available at http://www.chesapeakebay.net/chesapeakebaywatershed
agreement/page [https://perma.cc/P3LT-7253].
339 See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text.
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Recall that WQSs merge state and federal powers to choose means
and ends, amalgamating them in a continuing planning process that
renders them the provisional and shared work of both sovereigns. They
are the perfect foil for electoral accountability.340 Political competition at
each level—and increasingly at local levels—gives any aggrieved party
a reason to delay—electoral competition is always in progress—which,
in turn, sustains high demand for assurances and measurable prog-
ress.341 Allocating the burdens of uncertainty in this dynamic is a princi-
pal key to success. As the critics of collaborative approaches argue, detailed
and explicit WQSs can make a big practical difference.342 But calculating
the pollution that is compatible with our shared environmental quality
goals inevitably sharpens our sense of appropriate contributions.343 Sur-
viving the inevitable challenge(s) without proof either of the cause/effect
relationships behind prescribed ambient conditions or the cause/effect
relationships linking controls to ambient conditions will remain a litiga-
tion risk few experienced administrators want to run, regardless of tool
choice. Part IV takes stock of the broader lessons in the Chesapeake.
IV. AN EVOLVED CONCEPT OF LAW IN COERCING COLLABORATION?
Much as the rise of estimative techniques collectivizing the struggle
for water quality has featured in the Chesapeake experience, equally im-
portant legal maneuvers were made. A deep legal literature traces the
340 Cf. Rubin, The Myth of Accountability, supra note 56, at 2075–98 (ridiculing the pre-
supposition within most “accountability” arguments that the median voter will be able
to attribute responsibility to elected officials of one level or the other, one branch or the
other, or for particular choices in a stream of discretionary actions). CWA § 303(e) requires
that each state have “a continuing planning process” and EPA’s regulations make it
responsible for “periodically reviewing the adequacy of [a] State’s CPP.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 130.5(a). Because WQSs feature so prominently in a continuing “process,” id. § 130.5(b)(1),
they are arguably permanently provisional. This has never compromised a WQS’s status
as “law,” though, for they unquestionably “preempt” other law. Cf. Milwaukee v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304, 317–18 (1981) (holding that the CWA’s WQSs preempt federal common law
actions for tortious pollution of interstate waters).
341 See Rubin, The Myth of Accountability, supra note 56, at 2075–98.
342 See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Cooperative Federalism, Nutrients, and the Clean Water Act:
Three Cases Revisited, 44 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10426, 10431 (2014) (“The difference between
numerical and narrative standards is quite simple: one works.”).
343 Cf. HOUCK, supra note 91, at 58 (“The Achilles’ heel of [WQSs]-based regulation has
always been the difficulty of ascribing and quantifying environmental effects for par-
ticular discharge sources.”); Walker & Selman, supra note 327, at 9 (“With climate change
we might expect more extreme events than in the past, which will increase the risk of
failure of land-based mitigation activities.”).
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divide between agency actions with the force of law and those without
it.344 A newer literature traces the advent of what is euphemistically
known as the “new governance”: the performance-oriented use of informa-
tional, collaborative and market tools instead of command-and-control.345
But, as I have argued here and elsewhere, internal agency ordering, par-
ticularly the networked, iterative operations so typical of agencies like EPA
today, has emptied much of the utility from any simple distinctions between
legal and non-legal agency norms, between collaborative and regulatory
tools.346 Some courts have embraced a more spectral approach, although
not enough of them and not in sharp enough terms. The Chesapeake ex-
perience shows how central this aspect of contemporary regulation (and
administrative law) has become and why quicker, better progress on this
front is needed.
The Chesapeake experience may be unique in the data and program
capacity it has amassed. With it, the partners’ agents derived precise
theories of pollutant fate and transport, of particular species’ habitat
needs and of the causal relationships between targeted restoration goals
and individuated (if also attenuated) threats to a heavily disturbed,
dynamic system.347 The problem-solving intermediaries, the CBP and
CBC, have remained as pivotal as the regulators, continually updating
goals and expectations so as to keep means from becoming ends.348 But
they have done more than anyone else to prove that investments in data
and program capacity, no matter the scale, are never enough. Even as
EPA took massive data sets and crowd-sourced models into defining the
parties’ pollutant loading obligations and restoration targets, they still
needed a complex “accountability framework” grounded in reasonable
344 See, e.g., Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals,
and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311
(1992); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. REG. 1 (1990); David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules,
and the Perils of the Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276 (2010); William Funk, When is a “Rule”
a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legislative Rules,
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 661–63 (2002); Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law,
66 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 893 (2004); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force
of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 529–37 (2002); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547 (2000);
Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1466–68 (1992).
345 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
346 See Jamison E. Colburn, Agency Interpretations, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. 657 (2009).
347 See supra notes 239–48 and accompanying text.
348 Id.
2016] COERCING COLLABORATION 731
assurances to sustain cooperation.349 When the WIPs’ promised cuts came
due, the very thing missing from EPA’s binding regulations—and precisely
what had to be disclaimed in the AFBF lawsuit challenging the TMDL350—
had animated the defunct 2000 TMDL rulemaking: real norms imple-
menting the TMDL.351 The Chesapeake TMDL-as-operational-plan, backed
by the assurances, spanned the gaps in the law constituting TMDLs.352 It
pooled state and local jurisdiction over nonpoint sources, federal jurisdiction
over airborne sources, federal grant and subsidy funding and the Presi-
dent’s authority over the entirety of the Executive Branch.353 In short, it
fashioned obligations from local, state and federal discretion, which were
mutually reinforcing, continuously improving and means/ends effective.
EPA faces challenges constantly where the claim is that it has
employed ostensibly “informational” tools to constrain its partners’ discre-
tion illegally.354 Federalism hypersensitivities—where any federal policy
is immediately denounced as stealing the states’ prerogatives—have
made that claim all too common.355 The court that hears a majority of
these suits, the D.C. Circuit, has a byzantine doctrine meant to separate
legitimately informational from regulatory actions.356 The questions
mostly boil down to the state of the law before and after the action and
whether the action itself changed anyone’s legal rights or duties.357 But
this has become a permanent muddle. This part borrows a broader theory
sorting the proper from the improper uses of informational and regulatory
tools, a theory rooted in the parties’ relative competencies in multi-jurisdic-
tional environmental work. The principal focus is on mapping that theory
to the Chesapeake TMDL and its supporting norms to show how the
Chesapeake experience should inform other watershed-wide efforts and
349 Id.
350 See supra notes 208–16 and accompanying text.
351 See supra notes 107–18 and accompanying text.
352 See supra notes 181–204 and accompanying text.
353 See supra notes 226–48 and accompanying text.
354 See Kalen, supra note 53; Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Imple-
mentation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1991).
355 See, e.g., Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Clean Air Implementation Proj.
v. EPA, 150 F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015 (D.C.
Cir. 2000); Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 320 F.3d 272 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Nat’l Ass’n
of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Iowa League of Cities v. EPA,
711 F.3d 844 (8th Cir.2013); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
356 See Kalen, supra note 53, at 677–82 (noting an increasingly hostile D.C. Circuit that
manipulates the term “binding” to its own preferred ends); Manning, supra note 344, at
914–27.
357 See Manning, supra note 344, at 917–23.
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even, perhaps, larger scale collective contributory goods. Section A ex-
plains the balance of precision and flexibility struck in the Chesapeake
while Section B argues why it should matter in court.
A. Keeping Precision and Flexibility in Check: On Norms in
the Chesapeake
CWA § 303’s record nationally shows how reserving too much dis-
cretion (“flexibility”) is sub-optimal, both as to means and ends.358 The
TMDL’s federal WQC, sub-basin caps and detailed LA/WLA listed by
sector and major source (what we may call its resolution) were equaled in
credibility by Executive Order 13508, EPA’s Consequences Letter, its WIP
guidance and the CBP’s technical memoranda (collectively, the TMDL’s
assurances).359 The TMDL’s resolution and assurances combined exerted
real power over the Bay jurisdictions.360 Although Judge Rambo and the
Third Circuit denied a slew of claims rooted in the rhetoric of overreach,361
any number of prominent recent precedents could have supported the
opposite conclusions.362 So what about the Chesapeake experience should
protect the TMDL and its auxiliary norms from legal overthrow?
Often in law, the reasons for clarity and finality outweigh those of
leaving things undecided—of leaving them to later decision.363 “Legal in-
stitutions convert information, a set of norms, decisional capacity, and
enforcement capacity into decisions that they expect to have more value
358 See supra notes 100–18 and accompanying text. See David A. Super, Against Flexi-
bility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1417–23 (2011) (arguing that the justifications for “flexibil-
ity” and leaving things undecided in anticipation of acquiring better information are flawed
logically and that, in many cases, flexibility induces demonstrably inferior decisions).
359 See supra notes 92–118 and accompanying text.
360 See supra notes 322–39 and accompanying text.
361 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 984 F. Supp. 2d 289, 313–33 (M.D. Pa. 2013).
362 See, e.g., Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 864 (finding EPA letter to Senator trans-
mitting EPA’s interpretation of its rules was “promulgation” of new “effluent limitation”
because it led others to believe that “failure to conform will bring adverse consequences”);
Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1051, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding a permitting
guidance was “binding” because, as a practical matter, parties faced possible sanctions for
acting contrary thereto); Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Inc. v. Browner, 215 F.3d 45, 47–48
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding agency denial of petitioner’s claimed exemption was final and bind-
ing agency action because petitioner “must change its conduct or risk costly sanctions”).
363 Compare VERMEULE, supra note 253, at 179 (“There is a cost to the judicial focus on
particulars. Abstraction may represent a virtue and detail a vice. It is not the case that
decisions made with more information are always superior to decisions made with less
information.”), with Super, supra note 358, at 1377 (“One of law’s most basic functions
is to displace decisions across time. A system without temporal displacement is one of
will, not of law.”).
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than that of the inputs required to produce those decisions.”364 CWA § 303
merged state, federal and intermediary institutions’ four factors of produc-
tion into a networked, continuously evolving hybrid that for years paid
insufficient attention to the perils of inaction and non-decision. Nutrient
loadings to surface waters and their effects have evaded general decisions
nationally.365 Regional goals, composited from local knowledge and precise
estimates of nutrient fate and transport have been two keys to action in the
Chesapeake.366 Without something like the TMDL’s resolution and the
jurisdictions’ mutual assurances of its implementation, any single part-
ner’s inaction, and thus any single source’s freedom, was too easy to
justify. But by using its own (incomplete) jurisdiction to prescribe and
adjudicate, EPA put effective pressure on virtually all contributors. Of
course, without the regulations requiring that discharge permits be con-
formed to applicable WQSs and TMDLs,367 none of EPA’s leverage would
have existed (EPA learned long ago that courts will not abide its objec-
tions to individual permits unless it is grounded in some general stan-
dard announced ex ante).368 In short, EPA’s enforcement discretion—so
keenly focused by its own regulations, interstate competition and the
record of futile past efforts was used to spur collaborative collective
action generating a basin-wide regime.369
It would be a mistake to ignore modeling’s role in this evolution.
Ideally, evidentiary and inferential methods are always “transparent”
and explicable.370 In reality, such norms too often empower the specially
interested minority to engage in litigious “sandbagging”371 with the help
of generalist judges most concerned to right wrongs in their own case.372
364 Super, supra note 358, at 1399.
365 See URGENT CALL TO ACTION, supra note 13. The 1998 announcement of a “Clean
Water Action Plan” ostensibly turned national attention toward a “watershed approach”
against “runoff from city streets, rural areas, and other sources.” U.S. EPA and Dep’t of
Agric., Notice of Availability of Clean Water Action Plan, 63 Fed. Reg. 14109, 14109
(1998). Since then there has been little “action” against nutrients except on a state-by-
state, and now regional basis.
366 See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
367 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.44(d)(1), 122.4(i).
368 See Wash. v. U.S. EPA, 573 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1978); Ford Motor Co. v. U.S. EPA, 567
F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1977).
369 See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 35–51.
370 See Pasky Pascual et al., Making Method Visible: Improving The Quality of Science-
Based Regulation, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 429, 468 (2013).
371 See id. at 470.
372 An especially instructive reversal of a district judge’s overreaching use of arbitrariness
review is San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 599–638 (9th
Cir. 2014).
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“It is one thing to note that methods are invisible, but it is quite another
to imagine how the regulatory discussions would look if methods were
more centrally discussed,”373 or to enforce norms against agencies at-
tempting to solve intractable factual and collective action problems at
once.374 As both Hayek and the new governance scholars have insisted,
human knowledge is not just “fragmented, diffuse, and contextual.”375
Very often, it is “tacit”: “people . . . come to know many things that they
cannot consciously explain to others or even to themselves.”376 Delibera-
tion in such contexts is too often a waste of time; legal requirements in
its name are worse. The courts rightly rejected the Farm Bureau’s pro-
cess criticisms of the Chesapeake TMDL for this reason.377
Still, as poultry manure on Maryland’s Eastern Shore and milldams
in Pennsylvania’s past illustrate,378 using central or standard estimates
in aggregative planning is as perilous as it is necessary. Some think it
better to await true knowledge’s arrival.379 But EPA’s approach to water
quality criteria, allowing states’ use of anything not provably wrong,380
373 Pascual et al., supra note 370, at 459.
374 See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING
A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 193–204 (2003).
375 See Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and Rules,
Organization and Law, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 357, 363 (2010).
376 Id. at 363. For Hayek’s account, see F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35
AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 526–27 (1945) (arguing that the “price system” is an “economy of
knowledge” wherein individual participants need to know little “in order to be able to
take the right action” and in which “only the most essential information is passed on, and
passed on only to those concerned”). For the new governance account, see Dorf & Sabel,
supra note 12, at 292–314.
377 See Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 984 F. Supp. 2d 289, 333–43 (M.D. Pa. 2013)
(rejecting process claims); Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 306–08 (3d
Cir. 2015).
378 See supra notes 254–60, 302–05, and accompanying text.
379 See, e.g., Alexandra Dapolito Dunn & Meghan Boian, Postcards from the Edge: Per-
spectives to Reinvigorate Clean Water Act Cooperative Federalism, 5 J. ENERGY & ENVTL.
L. 68, 73–79 (2013). Most recent precedents suggest that modeling in itself adds nothing to
a case against an agency for arbitrariness. See, e.g., San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth.
v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 616–34 (9th Cir. 2014); Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abate-
ment Dist. v. U.S. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 24–29 (1st Cir. 2012); Alaska v. Lubchenco, 825 F.
Supp. 2d 209, 215–23 (D.D.C. 2011); Northwest Coalition for Alternatives v. U.S. EPA,
544 F.3d 1043, 1048–53 (9th Cir. 2008). On the other hand, where the agency’s model rests
upon erroneous data or assumptions, see, e.g., Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139
F.3d 914, 922–24 (D.C. Cir. 1998), or has not been subjected to adequate notice and
comment, see, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Admin.,
494 F.3d 188, 199–203 (D.C. Cir. 2007), judicial review has been a highly potent check.
380 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.11(b)(1)(iii) (any grounds “scientifically defensible” will suffice).
2016] COERCING COLLABORATION 735
abetted decades of inaction in the Chesapeake (and elsewhere).381 Unprece-
dented expansion in both animal agriculture and impervious infrastruc-
ture underlay a prolonged deferral of quantified, detailed and obligatory
pollutant reductions dragged on in the name of “cooperation.”382 Rarely
have courts proven capable of sorting out this continuum.383 Mostly they
rule it out of judicial review’s purview.384
What EPA, the CBP and the Obama White House synthesized in
the Chesapeake was something between these poles: a means of spurring
sub-national jurisdictions into using their own local knowledge—if they
have it—backed by sufficient assurances that everyone would do their
part, or else effective proxy actions would ensue. This synthesis should
be replicable elsewhere for other, similar problems. Section B situates
this development in the doctrine.
B. Threats, Plans and Power: Toward Reviewability in
Coerced Collaboration
Had the TMDL been judged sufficiently “binding” or coercive, it
would have been invalidated as exceeding EPA’s authority385 or as having
been adopted without the requisite process.386 Had EPA’s WIP guidances,
consequences letters, or technical memos been challenged, they might
have been vacated as improperly adopted “legislative” rules.387 Had EPA’s
demand for “reasonable assurances” been better litigated, it might have
been enjoined as “plainly inconsistent” with 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i).388 Finally,
381 See, e.g., Steve Szkotak, Grant withdrawal stalls W.Va.’s No. 1 bay project, ASSOCI-
ATED PRESS STATE WIRE: VIRGINIA, Sept. 24, 2011.
382 See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text.
383 But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528–35 (2007).
384 See, e.g., Natural Res. Defense Council v. FDA, 760 F.3d 151, 154–56 (2d Cir. 2014);
WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, 751 F.3d 649, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Defenders of Wildlife
v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 2008); New York Pub. Interest Research Group v.
Whitman, 321 F.3d 316 (2d Cir. 2003).
385 See supra notes 206–12 and 344 and accompanying text.
386 See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Fed. Motor Carrier Admin., 494 F.3d
188, 199–203 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
387 The APA requires notice and comment procedures for “legislative” rules but not for “inter-
pretative” rules or “general statements of policy.” Because the Supreme Court has rarely
attempted to do so, the lower federal courts, especially the D.C. Circuit, have had to differ-
entiate these categories (to rather dubious results). See Manning, supra note 344, at
914–27. Neither of EPA’s two WIP guidance documents were subject to notice and comment.
388 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(i) defines the component values of a TMDL’s calculations. Agencies’
interpretations of their regulations are ordinarily controlling unless they are “plainly
erroneous or inconsistent” therewith. See Decker v. Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
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had someone challenged the setting of 2025 as the overall goal for 60%
of Bay segments’ attainment of their WQSs, the executive power to “faith-
fully execute” the law might have invalidated everything.389 Decades of
CWA practice show each of these steps was as vital as it was vulnerable.
Is a TMDL ever a purely “informational” norm?390 Are federal WQC
purely recommendatory if EPA rejects a state’s deviation therefrom for
lack of conclusive proof of its validity? Could Maryland or Virginia even
possibly restore and maintain the Bay’s “chemical, physical, and biologi-
cal integrity” without the increasing federalization finally undertaken?391
When courts must sort out whether an agency’s action is binding,
their search may take them beyond the formalities and labels into whether
the action compels compliance with its terms as would a law.392 Even press
releases can compel regulated parties under the right circumstances.393
But courts evidently are not as good at this analysis as we would expect.
For their inquiry into whether an agency’s action has changed the law’s
content is carried out without much sense of what law and discretion
have become in the administrative state. What does it mean for EPA to
compel another regulator’s choices? Is that compulsion constitutive of law
or obligation? An agency like EPA has myriad kinds of power over states,
the regulated community and other stakeholders.394 But when a court
agrees to sort out whose discretion it should be to make or to bracket
some decision in a coercive/collaborative context, it has to construe the
1326, 1337 (2013). The same claim by different means would be to challenge EPA’s use
of its 1991 TMDL guidance as an improperly adopted “legislative” rule. See, e.g., Appa-
lachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
389 Cf. OLC Memo on DACA, supra note 198, at 5 (“Limits on enforcement discretion are
both implicit in, and fundamental to, the Constitution’s allocation of governmental
powers between the two political branches.”) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
390 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
391 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); cf. id. § 1251(b) (recognizing as “the policy of the Congress”
to preserve the “primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution . . .”).
392 See Kalen, supra note 53, at 677–82; Manning, supra note 344, at 914–27; Colburn,
supra note 346, at 690–92.
393 See CropLife America v. EPA, 329 F.3d 876, 881–84 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that agency
press release had a compulsive effect on regulated parties); Iowa League of Cities v. EPA,
711 F.3d 844, 864 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that agency’s letter answering Senator’s
inquiry would have compulsive effect on regulated parties).
394 See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (finding from its context that
EPA’s monitoring guidance for Clean Air Act permits was the agency giving its partner
states “their ‘marching orders’ ” expecting them “to fall in line, as all have done, save
perhaps Florida and Texas.”); Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 861–76.
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real meaning of an agency’s rules, the agency’s practices implementing
them and the source(s) of the agency’s residual authority in a single
case.395 An intransitive statute is only the surface of that context; highly
contingent, dynamic, polarized relationships and intergovernmental and
partisan frictions comprise much more of it.396 Thus, the reviewing court
must identify, weigh and reconcile factors for which it has no expertise
and too little coherent judicial doctrine.397
Between the doctrines of ripeness,398 the APA’s requirement of
“final agency action”399 and the messy differentiation of “legislative” from
all other kinds of agency rules,400 there are ample filters confining such
review.401 Given their uneven application, though, they do not check abuses
of the cause of action purely for leverage. And it is often a lot of leverage
given the risks of free-riding, compressed schedules and uncertainty. The
judicial impulse to hold agencies “accountable” will remain grounded in a
mythic view of the state until it updates its software, so to speak, to grap-
ple with the complex nature of legal discretion and obligation today.402 The
property of bindingness is too crude.403 Government-backed coercion may
395 Cf. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that in
reviewability the “most important factor concerns the actual legal effect (or lack thereof)
of the agency action in question on regulated entities” and analyzing challenged agency
rule in the context of its addressees, its imperative wording, the authorizing statute,
existing practices, the possibility of penalties for noncompliance, the state’s views, etc.).
396 Id. at 249, 252.
397 Id. at 252.
398 See, e.g., Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998).
399 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232 (1980); Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154 (1997).
400 See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182 (1993).
401 The “puzzling” presumption of reviewability, which often mixes ripeness with finality
doctrines, has resulted in a crazy-quilt family of doctrines for interpreting enabling statutes,
precedent, and the APA. See Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability,
127 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2014). See, e.g., Reliable Auto. Sprinkler Co. v. CPSC, 324 F.3d
726, 731–35 (D.C. Cir. 2003); General Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d 442, 449–53 (D.C.
Cir.2004); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 11–17 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Cement Kiln Recycling Coalition v. EPA, 493 F.3d 207, 214–18 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
402 Cf. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT, supra note 48, at 235 (“The concept of legal rights is not
merely under-inclusive, in that it applies only to those benefits that are enforced by
adjudication, but over-inclusive as well. It confers a misleading dignity on certain gov-
ernmental actions that fail to provide any real benefits.”); Bagley, supra note 401, at 1336
(arguing that because it is “unjustified in principle and harmful in practice” the presumption
of reviewability of agency rules should be “scrapped” in favor of a more contextual approach
to each statute and its signals about how to optimize judicial review in its administration).
403 For example, the compliance order at issue in Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), was
found to be “binding” and “final” because it exerted coercive pressure on the Sacketts—
despite the fact that EPA could only enforce its order by suing them in court, whereupon
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be much of what distinguishes legal from other obligations,404 but for pur-
poses of intergovernmental relations it should be a certain kind of coercion.
Proper respect for the lack of judicially manageable standards405 would
not preclude review where abuses of discretion are plain. But an abuse
in this context can only be proven from the reasons why an administrator
has sought to constrain, focus or consolidate legal discretion with some
tool, whether informational or regulatory, which others find coercive.406
In the Chesapeake starting in 2009 the TMDL’s resolution and
assurances filled a void left by decades of partial cooperation.407 EPA
navigated it around the wreckage of the 2000 TMDL rule-making.408 Paying
close attention to the stakes, stakeholders and available knowledge and
tools, EPA’s coercion of states and the District was proportionate to the risks
each jurisdiction’s failures represented.409 Free-riding was one, but a subtly
different risk—the excuse non-contributors create for others—was also
afoot.410 The microeconomic creed that for any pollution problem there
are least-cost avoiders to be found, coupled with the political conviction
that states are best positioned to find them, drove the bargain.411 Sus-
taining credible commitments from all partners backed by needed assur-
ances, estimative analysis and the means of continuously improving it
all, demanded as much.412 The fact that EPA did so transparently and
a court would review the order’s validity. Id. at 1372. What the Supreme Court was
either unable or unwilling to explain is why, before any “strictly legal” consequences
ensued, Ohio Forestry, 523 U.S. at 733, EPA’s order was nevertheless “binding” on the
Sacketts. A legal right awaiting adjudication—with the burden of proof in its favor—cannot
have been violated by ipse dixit unless it was no right in the first place. Cf. Walter Wheeler
Cook, Introduction: Hohfeld’s Contribution to the Science of Law, in WESLEY NEWCOMB
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING 7 (Walter
Wheeler Cook ed. (1946)) (“Right in the narrow sense—as the correlative of duty . . .
signifies one’s affirmative claim against another, as distinguished from ‘privilege,’ one’s
freedom from the right or claim of another.”).
404 Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 219, at 40 (“Coercion may be to law what flying is to birds:
not strictly necessary but so ubiquitous that a full understanding of the phenomenon
requires that we consider it.”)
405 See Manning, supra note 344, at 929–37.
406 See id. at 893–94.
407 See 1983 CHESAPEAKE BAY AGREEMENT, supra note 142, at 1; and Jonathan Cannon,
Checking in on the Chesapeake: Some Questions of Design, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1131, 1131
(2006).
408 See supra notes 107–23 and accompanying text.
409 See supra notes 363–77 and accompanying text.
410 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
411 See supra notes 239–48 and accompanying text.
412 See supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text.
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with the feedback of its public, peers and partners413 shows a commit-
ment to proportionality lacking from many intergovernmental schemes.414
In short, a court would be fully justified to find EPA’s WIP guidances,
consequences letters, technical memos and even perhaps the TMDL
itself, unreviewable or, at the least, due great deference.415
Just as the law of contracts did not replace the practice of promising
(and, indeed, borrows heavily from it),416 coercing a “partner” jurisdiction
to follow guidance does nothing necessarily to undermine electoral or fed-
eral principles.417 It does not necessarily interfere with “accountability,”418
whether by shifting relative costs419 or ignoring relative competence.420
Each of those relationships is contingent and contextual. Planning with
413 See supra notes 163–72 and accompanying text.
414 Cf. Util. Air Reg. Group v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (claiming EPA’s interpre-
tation of CAA would bring about an “enormous and transformative expansion” of its
powers necessitating heightened scrutiny).
415 Compare Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 894 (1990) (dismissing challenge
to agency program for lack of reviewable final agency action and observing that it is
“understandably frustrating” to an interest group that “[e]xcept where Congress explicitly
provides for our correction of the administrative process at a higher level of generality
we intervene . . . only when, and to the extent that, a specific “final agency action” has
an actual or immediately threatened effect.”), with Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Unintended
Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts Have Contributed to the
Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 7, 27–28 (1991) (arguing that the
“widespread phenomenon of unrealistic and inconsistent judicial commands to agencies
is attributable to two factors—malleable doctrines and growth in the highly decentralized
federal judiciary”—and that the Supreme Court should reduce the opportunities for
federal courts to act against agency policy choices with which they disagree).
416 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLI-
GATION (1980).
417 Cf. SCHAUER, supra note 219, at 138–39 (noting the ubiquity of legal sanctions within
“cooperative” business arrangements like corporations and contracts); Nat’l Fed’n Indep.
Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602–05 (2012) (identifying impermissible coer-
cion of the states by distinguishing financial “inducement” and other “relatively mild
encouragement” from a proverbial “gun to the head”). Although the Founding generation
clearly anticipated a suite of political risks worth guarding against, a better accounting
and checking of all possible political risks has necessitated constant innovation from
within the system of institutions they created. See generally VERMEULE, supra note 253.
418 See Rubin, The Myth of Accountability, supra note 56, at 2120–25 (showing that
“accountability” must come from within “the complex structure of administrative hier-
archies that constitute our basic mechanism for governing ourselves”).
419 See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation
of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 348–61, 387–415 (2000) (showing that the
allocation of constitutional “costs” to government agencies will only affect behavioral
change as those costs translate into political costs).
420 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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provisional goals, duties and methods that are binding until renegotiated
is akin to the highly elaborated bargaining of the private sector today.421
Where these bargains turn out not to be renegotiable over a longer term
they may well justify judicial intervention.422 Agency actions like those
in the Chesapeake might constitute reviewable “law” to whatever extent
they are demonstrably not provisional, but neither does being provisional
exclude being imperative.423 Using practical power to coerce a state to
create and transparently follow a plan can be no more suspect than a
state that has for decades shirked its legal “responsibility” to solve a
major public problem.424
This leaves only the nature of Article II’s limits on such planning
as “execution” of a law like the CWA and its WQSs.425 President Obama’s
Executive Order 13508 arguably committed the Chesapeake’s WQSs to
desuetude until 2025 at the earliest—and it capped a decade of delaying
a TMDL.426 In another light, of course, the order brought needed focus
and urgency where too many other TMDLs are nothing but equations.427
A pragmatic bow to the bounds of public resources, coupled with a rea-
soned prioritization thereof, may be the best we can hope for when our
421 See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM L. REV. 431 (2009).
422 Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion for the D.C. Circuit in National Mining Association, an
opinion citing Professor Manning’s proposal to the courts that they substitute lesser
degrees of deference to “nonlegislative” rules for their failed efforts to force agencies
through notice and comment, signaled a fuller turn toward Professor Manning’s skep-
ticism of judicial efforts along this margin. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d
243, 251–52 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Manning, supra note 344, at 893).
423 Cf. Norton v. South. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004) (finding statute
gave agency a mandatory duty as to “object to be achieved” but left it enough “discretion
in deciding how to achieve it” to render agency action unreviewable under the APA).
Nothing should turn on the use of sanctions against failures/defection as opposed to
rewards for cooperation/contribution. In too many contexts, sanctions are demonstrably
better motivation. See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad Is Stronger Than Good, 5 REV.
GEN. PSYCH. 323 (2001).
424 Clean Water Act § 101(b)’s recitation of the states’ “responsibilities” of protecting
surface waters, bolstered by CWA § 117(g)(1)(B)’s duty to “achieve and maintain . . . the
water quality requirements necessary to restore living resources in the Chesapeake Bay
ecosystem,” must, in the last analysis, count for something.
425 See U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 3.
426 Cf. Houck, supra note 149, at 10222 (concluding that the TMDL is “earth-shifting”
because at least it plots a course to attainment, albeit with a long-delayed schedule).
427 Cf. Houck, supra note 149, at 10213 (observing that the Chesapeake focus reflected an
Administration that was carefully picking its targets, setting an ambitious goal in a huge
estuary with critical (but all too common) water quality problems in a region “right under
the nose of Congress”).
2016] COERCING COLLABORATION 741
legislated goals as a society outpace the treasure we will devote to them.428
At least when it takes the form of a publicly reasoned, proportionate
directive from the President, such pragmatism can be distinguished—in
court, if need be—from rank rewriting of the law to favor one’s friends or
bosses. In the legislative process, the latter may be business as usual.429
In enforcement discretion, it is a constitutional breach.430
CONCLUSION
Is the Chesapeake experience so unique? Data from CWA § 319—
funded monitoring and planning431 is now beginning to emerge in many
watersheds, yielding the sort of granular estimates of sediments and
nutrients’ origins, transport and fate which first emerged in the Chesa-
peake a decade ago.432 CWA § 208 has long required states to develop plans
428 See Defenders of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (refusing to
order emergency attention to problem because agency’s petition denial was “a policy
decision to focus its resources on a comprehensive strategy, which in light of the
information before the agency at the time, was reasoned and adequately supported by the
record”); cf. OLC Memo on DACA, supra note 198, at 30–31 (linking the potential scope
of the “deferred action” program for applying enforcement discretion in deportation
proceedings to the scale of the appropriations shortage and concluding that there was
“little practical danger” of the order’s preventing an execution of the immigration statutes
that would otherwise have ensued); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 785 F.3d 243, 249
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[O]ne of the main goals of any President, and his or her White House
staff, is to ensure that such consultation and coordination occurs in the many disparate
and far-flung parts of the Executive behemoth.”); CHRISTOPHER K. ANSELL, PRAGMATIST
DEMOCRACY: EVOLUTIONARY LEARNING AS PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 9–14 (2011) (arguing that
pragmatists accept public problems are not “solved” so much as they are avoided).
“Pragmatism departs from a strictly positivist view of experimentation by emphasizing
the provisional, probative, creative, and jointly construed character of social experimen-
tation.” Id. at 12.
429 See ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 62, at 29–35.
430 Settling enforcement matters by rulemaking breaches the outer bounds of Article II,
§ 3 where the agency “consciously and expressly adopt[s] a general policy that is so ex-
treme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 833 n.4 (1985); see also Citizens for a Better Env’t v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117
(D.C. Cir. 1983), 1130–36 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting); Ass’n of Irritated
Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In such cases, the agency action
should not be one of unreviewable discretion, especially if it departs from the statute’s
express enforcement scheme. Cf. id. at 1041–46 (Rogers, dissenting) (arguing that
agency’s rule-like “enforcement protocol” absolving regulated parties of liability under
three separate statutes prospectively with generic settlement terms executed by the
thousands went beyond Heckler’s exception to the presumption of reviewability).
431 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1329(b)–(m).
432 See EPA’s collection of § 319 “success stories” at http://water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps
/success319/ [https://perma.cc/7LBT-LCA9].
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that could easily become WIP-like TMDL implementation plans—espe-
cially with so many TMDLs now having been prepared in response to
court orders.433 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, although CWA
§ 117 might be Chesapeake-specific, § 301(b)(1)(C)434 and EPA’s rules im-
plementing the WQSs are applicable nationwide.435 So the same leverage
EPA found against the Bay-watershed jurisdictions, rooted in the imper-
ative to attain ambient environmental quality goals,436 could be used in
other multistate watersheds like the Arkansas, Colorado, Columbia and
Snake, Connecticut, Gila, Ohio, Mississippi, Missouri, Platte, Red and
Tennessee river systems, the estuaries of the Gulf Coast, Gulf of Maine,
Long Island Sound and the Great Lakes.437 Each of those watersheds is
now grappling with CWA § 303(d)(1)’s mandate of achieving WQSs.438
Indeed, with Congress paralyzed by climate change’s interstate,
market and political forces,439 the Chesapeake’s outlines are all too evi-
dent in the Obama Administration’s “Clean Power Plan.”440 As has become
clear in the Chesapeake, granular data must be used to estimate needed
contributions, to fashion continuously improving estimates of contribu-
tors’ causal significance and, thus, the proxy actions needed if they falter.
As EPA’s 2010 GHG reporting rule yields such data for any necessary
CAA § 111(d) “federal implementation plan” if states do not cooperate,441
they face losing the right to choose their own targets and modulate the
actions against them. Quite similar to 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i)—forbidding
the permitting of sources that “contribute to” a violation of applicable
433 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(a)–(j).
434 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C).
435 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.44(d)(1)(vii)(A)–(B), 122.4(i).
436 See supra notes 66–77 and accompanying text.
437 Cf. Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. EPA, 792 F.3d 281, 308 (3d Cir. 2015) (remarking that
§ 117 “does not add to EPA’s regulatory authority” as compared to the Act more generally).
438 See 33 U.S.C. 1313(d).
439 Cf. Johnston, supra note 28, at 1613–17 (arguing that congressional action on GHGs
is not to be expected until a clear majority of states would benefit directly from con-
trolling emissions).
440 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662 (Oct. 23, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 60). A key interpretive maneuver in the plan is to treat the CAA § 111’s standard of
“best system of emissions reduction . . . adequately demonstrated” as that amalgam of
measures a state selects to meet or exceed EPA’s calculated emissions reduction goals for
a covered state’s entire electricity-generating sector on the basis of its current circum-
stances and feasible improvements. See id. at 64758. Barring state plan submission and
approval, EPA will implement a federal plan for that state. Id. at 64861.
441 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2015).
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WQSs442—EPA’s CAA rules have for decades required that states impose
against their own sources any “best system” of emission reduction which
EPA determines has been “adequately demonstrated.”443 Either a state
tailors the mandate to its sources or EPA will.
Good case studies are more than anecdote, but they are never
general proof. Much about the Chesapeake experience is unique. Still,
several dilemmas in the Chesapeake are common among public goods
problems today: normative disagreement and legal intransitivity; evolv-
ing factual uncertainties; interacting levels of relatively autonomous
regulators with under- and over-lapping authorities; and the need to
guard against free-riding while still allowing for on-course corrections.
Solving for these dilemmas without devoting massive resources to fail-
ures like EPA’s 2000 TMDL rule-making, or being gutted by lawsuits like
the one thrown out in the AFBF case, is urgent work. The Chesapeake
now stands as the exemplar.
442 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(i); see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
443 See 40 C.F.R. § 60.22(b)(5) (1989).

